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6.3  |  Military equipment (pre-conflict)
625.  The impact on the UK’s ability to continue to conduct military operations
after the conflict phase of operations was never fully considered.
626.  Lord Boyce told the Inquiry:
“The theoretical planning against the Defence Planning Assumptions is you don’t
do this sort of operation for an extended period longer than about six months.
But it never seemed to me very likely that we would be out [of] there [Iraq] in
six months.”341
627.  Sir Kevin later said: “Our assumptions never involve more than six months at that
level.”342
628.  With regard to large scale deployments, Gen Jackson stated:
“… the large scale concept, in land component terms we are talking around
30,000 or 25,000 certainly, the concept is you put in that large commitment on a
one-off basis and then you must downsize, because the Army cannot sustain a
deployment of 25,000 to 30,000 indefinitely.”343
629.  The Inquiry was offered different perspectives on the degree to which
exceeding the Planning Assumptions had put a strain on the system that it was
not able to meet.
630.  Lt Gen Fry told the Inquiry that:
“Over time the scale of ambition got larger and larger, so at the end of it we were
looking at something which involved a full deployed joint force with … land, air and
maritime forces, and in addition to that, special forces and logistic forces as well.”344
631.  Asked if he had thought there was sufficient time to prepare the force for battle,
Lt Gen Fry stated that it was “a bit of a rush and there were inherent risks involved”.345
632.  Gen Reith told the Inquiry that he was “quite happy” in terms of readiness and
training.346 He said that 7 Armoured Brigade had been selected because it was “the
most highly trained of all the armoured brigades”. In addition, 3 Commando Brigade and
16 Air Assault Brigade were both part of the Joint Rapid Reaction Force and, therefore,
“maintained a high standard of training and readiness on a permanent basis”.
341  Public hearing, 3 December 2009, page 101.
342  Private hearing, 6 May 2010, page 53.
343  Public hearing, 28 July 2010, page 42.
344  Public hearing, 16 December 2009, page 5.
345  Public hearing, 16 December 2009, page 40.
346  Private hearing, 15 January 2010, page 50.
103
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