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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
1150.  On 19 March, Mr Straw and Mr Hoon informed Mr Blair that:
the UK would not be expected to contribute resources to anything
other than security during the first phase of the US post-conflict plan
(a transitional administration headed by ORHA);
it would be premature to take a view on the merits of sectors for the
following phase; but
it would help the US and military planners to agree on the UK’s
medium‑term contribution.
1151.  The minute concluded with a warning that Coalition partners were thin on
the ground. If the campaign did not go well, there would not be many who would
be prepared or able to take part.
1152.  Mr Straw and Mr Hoon considered only the UK’s military presence in Iraq.
They made no reference to the civilian contribution.
1153.  Sir Kevin Tebbit expressed concern about the transition from a primarily
military effort to longer-term civilian-led reconstruction. It would be necessary to
work hard to avoid dependence on the Armed Forces to carry out civilian tasks.
1154.  Mr Straw and Mr Hoon sent Mr Blair a joint minute on the UK military contribution
to post-conflict Iraq on 19 March.494
1155.  The draft was subject to “intensive consultations” at official level in the MOD and
the FCO.495
1156.  In the FCO, Mr Ricketts sent the draft to Mr Straw’s Private Office with the
comment:
“This is a clear note on a crucial issue. If the Secretary of State [Mr Straw] could OK
it (I showed him a slightly earlier draft this morning) it can go to No.10 tonight, for
discussion at the PM’s meeting at 0830 on 20 March.”496
1157.  In the MOD, the draft was cleared by Adm Boyce and Sir Kevin Tebbit.
1158.  Sir Kevin commented:
“In terms of our military capacity, with an eye to the aftermath, it would clearly be
preferable to confine ourselves to SE Iraq and not bite off more than we can chew.
I accept, however, that we should be prepared, initially, for our forces to be fairly
494 Minute Straw and Hoon to Prime Minister, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military Contribution to post-conflict
Iraq’.
495 Minute Chilcott to Private Secretary [FCO], [undated], ‘Iraq: The UK’s Military Contribution to
Post‑Conflict Iraq’.
496 Manuscript comment Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], [undated], on Minute Chilcott to
Private Secretary [FCO], [undated], ‘Iraq: The UK’s Military Contribution to Post-Conflict Iraq’.
516
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