The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
decision to
go back to the UN.” That should include addressing the nature of
Saddam
Hussein’s
Iraqi regime.
193.
The possible
timetable for launching the initiative in the UN and the contents
of a
UN
resolution were also explored.
194.
The options
for a UN resolution included a very short resolution along the
lines of
the
ultimatum to Iraq in 1990 or a fuller resolution which spelt
out:
•
the extent
to which Saddam was in violation of previous
resolutions;
•
the steps
he must take if Iraq was to be welcomed back into the
international
community;
and
•
the need
for a “real” deadline, possibly 1 November.
195.
The
possibility of “very invasive” measures, which would involve troops
being
deployed
inside Iraq, e.g. to protect the inspectors or in northern Iraq to
prevent attacks
on the
Kurds, and which would change the way Saddam Hussein could rule
Iraq, were
also
raised.
196.
Sir David
told Dr Rice that a deadline “must be right if we were to
avoid endless
prevarication
and evasion”. He referred to the model which had been used
“successfully”
the
previous year in dealing with the Taliban, and said that the UK had
done some
thinking on
a resolution. That would be shared with Dr Rice
“shortly”.
197.
Sir David
sent Mr Straw a personal copy of his minute to
Mr Blair.68
198.
Visiting
Washington for talks with officials in the US State Department and
National
Security
Council (NSC) on 29 August, Mr Wright explained the “difficult
domestic political
management
problems” on Iraq faced by the Government in the
UK.69
He
“stressed”
the
importance of ensuring that there was “no daylight” between the US
and UK in their
public
presentations and the need “in particular to focus on the WMD
threat and how
best to
address it”. That meant:
“… we
needed to use the UN track. This was the best way to pursue control
of
WMD. It
would help to build international support. And if Iraq rejected a
robust
inspection
regime, it would strengthen the case for other
action.”
199.
The
discussions acknowledged that much of the intelligence on Iraq’s
WMD was
“inferential”
and that the “aim” should be to present the case “in terms of
[Iraqi] failure to
comply with
the international community’s demands since 1991”.
68
Manuscript
comment Manning, 29 August 2002, on Minute Manning to Prime
Minister, 29 August 2002,
‘Iraq:
Conversation with Condi Rice’.
69
Telegram
1104 Washington to FCO, 29 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Visit by Stephen
Wright, DUS, to
Washington,
29 August’.
128