Previous page | Contents | Next page
The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
decision to go back to the UN.” That should include addressing the nature of Saddam
Hussein’s Iraqi regime.
193.  The possible timetable for launching the initiative in the UN and the contents of a
UN resolution were also explored.
194.  The options for a UN resolution included a very short resolution along the lines of
the ultimatum to Iraq in 1990 or a fuller resolution which spelt out:
the extent to which Saddam was in violation of previous resolutions;
the steps he must take if Iraq was to be welcomed back into the international
community; and
the need for a “real” deadline, possibly 1 November.
195.  The possibility of “very invasive” measures, which would involve troops being
deployed inside Iraq, e.g. to protect the inspectors or in northern Iraq to prevent attacks
on the Kurds, and which would change the way Saddam Hussein could rule Iraq, were
also raised.
196.  Sir David told Dr Rice that a deadline “must be right if we were to avoid endless
prevarication and evasion”. He referred to the model which had been used “successfully”
the previous year in dealing with the Taliban, and said that the UK had done some
thinking on a resolution. That would be shared with Dr Rice “shortly”.
197.  Sir David sent Mr Straw a personal copy of his minute to Mr Blair.68
198.  Visiting Washington for talks with officials in the US State Department and National
Security Council (NSC) on 29 August, Mr Wright explained the “difficult domestic political
management problems” on Iraq faced by the Government in the UK.69 He “stressed”
the importance of ensuring that there was “no daylight” between the US and UK in their
public presentations and the need “in particular to focus on the WMD threat and how
best to address it”. That meant:
“… we needed to use the UN track. This was the best way to pursue control of
WMD. It would help to build international support. And if Iraq rejected a robust
inspection regime, it would strengthen the case for other action.”
199.  The discussions acknowledged that much of the intelligence on Iraq’s WMD was
“inferential” and that the “aim” should be to present the case “in terms of [Iraqi] failure to
comply with the international community’s demands since 1991”.
68 Manuscript comment Manning, 29 August 2002, on Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 29 August 2002,
‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.
69 Telegram 1104 Washington to FCO, 29 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Visit by Stephen Wright, DUS, to
Washington, 29 August’.
128
Previous page | Contents | Next page