6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
986.
The paper on
the UK response to Phase IVa described Phase IV as
“strategically
decisive”
and highlighted a number of significant gaps in post-conflict
planning:
•
the absence
of a detailed UK/US policy on the role of the military in
maintaining
law and
order and detaining civilians;
•
a risk that
UK forces would face a humanitarian situation for which they were
not
resourced
unless there was early agreement that DFID would fund
humanitarian
assistance
through military channels;
•
the
military was still waiting for the Treasury’s agreement to an
initiative for £10m
to be made
available to UK forces for QIPs; and
•
the absence
of a decision on how or whether the UK would pay Iraqi
public
sector
salaries.
987.
The paper
included, in full, US definitions of the end state for Phases IVa,
b and c:
•
Phase IVa:
“a stable environment in which the territorial integrity of Iraq
is
intact;
civil order is maintained; repairs to damaged civil infrastructure
are under
way;
humanitarian assistance is provided by the civilian sector; and an
interim
administration
is in place”.
•
Phase IVb:
“responsibility for stability and security passing from Coalition
military
to
responsible Iraqi institutions; rule of law is fully established;
necessary civil
infrastructure
is functioning and economic development is under way;
lessening
dependence
on humanitarian assistance; and a transitional civil administration
is
in place
with increasing Iraqi participation”.
•
Phase IVc:
“a durable, secure and stable Iraq sustained by Iraqis, in which
the
rule of law
is well established and civil order is maintained by Iraqi
authorities;
civil
infrastructure is functioning and economic development
continuing;
lessened
dependence on humanitarian assistance; authority had
been
transferred
to an Iraqi national government”.
988.
In the paper,
Lt Gen Reith explained that CFLCC had instructed all
commanders
to:
“… liaise
with and monitor local administrations within their area of
responsibility
… but …
only to directly intervene in the administrative process when
necessary
to maintain
public order and safety, or to prevent human suffering. Existing
Iraqi
government
organisations should be allowed and encouraged to function as
normal
and no
attempt should be made to reorganise or replace existing
structures.”
489