The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
427.
As part of the
final battle preparations, the contingent was completing
NBC
respirator
testing but, because 1 (UK) Div needed to move forward to assembly
areas,
its General
Officer Commanding (GOC), Major General Robin Brims, had
decided
to suspend
that process. Lt Gen Reith “strongly” supported this decision
from an
operational
perspective and said he could restart the process of testing “if
time allows”.
He
added:
“In terms
of risk, his manoeuvre units would prove difficult targets, once
battle
begins.
However the more static units in the Divisional Support Group and
Joint
Force
Logistic Component would be at greater risk and thus I have
directed that
testing
should continue for them. The Maritime and Air contingents will
also complete
the
process.”
428.
Lt Gen
Reith added: “Clearly Ministers will need to be
informed.”
429.
In the record
of Lord Bach’s meeting on 17 March, the key points
included:
•
other than
“the ongoing work on Phase IV”, there were “no major
outstanding
UOR
issues”;
•
a flexible
approach was needed on whether to continue with undelivered
UORs
“as
circumstances develop”;
•
there was
“a 100 tonne backlog of equipment” waiting to be delivered to
theatre;
•
there were
now “no significant outstanding NBC issues except on delivery
of
RVD tickets
into theatre”; and
•
“notwithstanding
helmet covers and floppy hats, which were taking
slightly
longer than
hoped for, 80% of clothing and boots ordered had been
delivered
and
prioritised in theatre. The overall figure of ‘desertised
personnel’ was
higher, as
it included those who had already been issued with desert kit
for
430.
At the Chiefs
of Staff meeting on 19 March, it was reported that only 3
percent of
the land
component’s respirators had been checked, “the work having been
overtaken
by other
events in-theatre”.212
431.
On
21 March, AM Stirrup reported to Lord Bach that 183 business
cases for UORs
had been
approved at a cost of £497m.213
432.
Desertisation
measures for the Challenger 2 vehicles had been delivered to
theatre
in the past
week (the fitting process of which was ongoing), along with Combat
ID
equipment
for all vehicles and ECBA, meaning that all unit demands for the
latter had
been
met.
211
Minute
APS/Minister(DP) to MA/DCDS(EC), 17 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Op
TELIC – UORs’.
212
Minutes,
19 March 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
213
Minute
DCDS(EC) to PS/Minister(DP), 21 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC
UORs’.
68