1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
•
the
development and production of SCUD-type missile
engines.
280.
UNSCOM’s
achievements demonstrated that:
“…
international weapons inspections under the auspices of the
United
Nations, if applied
with first-rate expertise and modern technology, can
achieve effective
results.”
281.
But UNSCOM was
continuing its work because it could not state that Iraq
had
“accounted
for all weapons, components and capabilities proscribed” in
resolution 687
for a
number of reasons, including Iraq’s unilateral programme of
destruction in
contravention
of resolution 687 and its policy of concealment “aimed at deceiving
the
inspectors
and at retaining limited but significant proscribed
capabilities”.
282.
Because of the
“inadequacies, incompleteness and lack of evidentiary
documentation”
in Iraq’s FFCDs, UNSCOM had been unable credibly to verify
Iraq’s
declarations.
In an effort to expedite that process, Mr Ekéus and
Mr Aziz had agreed to
adopt an
innovative process whereby UNSCOM presented its detailed findings
and an
assessment
of the outstanding problems at the “political level” in Baghdad.
This process
had started
by addressing missile issues in December 1996, followed by
discussions on
chemical
weapons in February and April 1997 and biological weapons in April
1997.
283.
The process
had “led to a much clearer understanding” by Iraq’s
political
leadership
of the problems and what Iraq needed to do to resolve them.
UNSCOM
hoped that
this would help to overcome the lack of progress on technical
issues.
284.
The report
stated that:
•
The new
process constituted “a fruitful approach” if Iraq was “fully
co-operative
and
transparent in its response to the Commission’s initiatives and
concerns”.
•
“Tangible
results” had “already been achieved” on missiles and
chemical
weapons.
•
Agreement
for remnants of missiles unilaterally destroyed by Iraq to be
removed
and
analysed outside Iraq had not been reached until late February, and
the
work would
require “several weeks or months before it was
completed”.
•
More
documentation on Iraq’s proscribed programmes should exist and
had
been
formally requested.
•
Iraq had
stated that there was no policy to withhold information and
when
documents
were discovered they were given to UNSCOM.
•
There were
difficulties on biological weapons. Iraq had been asked to
reconsider
its position
and provide a new declaration; and after some discussion
had
agreed
on 5 April to do so.
285.
UNSCOM also
reported that the completeness and accuracy of Iraq’s
declarations
and a clear
understanding of the scope and history of its proscribed programmes
were
essential
for an effective monitoring programme.
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