3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
62.
Sir David
Manning was in Washington on 17 May, for discussions on a range
of
issues
including India and Pakistan and the Middle East Peace Process
(MEPP).30
63.
In preparation
for Sir David Manning’s visit to Washington, Sir Christopher
Meyer
reported in
a personal letter that he had been told by a senior official in the
State
Department
that:
•
The
timeframe discussed between the Prime Minister and Bush was still
valid:
the first
quarter of next year was “realistic” for action against Saddam
Hussein.
•
CENTCOM was
hearing from British military sources that we were
contemplating
contributing an armoured division.
•
This was
serious stuff which was leading Administration hawks to forget
the
“but” in
our “yes, but …”31
64.
Sir
Christopher also recorded that it was doubtful that much work had
been done
on handling
the UN and getting the weapons inspectors back in and that the
nightmare
would be if
Dr Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, judged that the Iraqis
were
co-operating
and the US did not.
65.
Sir
Christopher advised that the UK had “been drawn into a fierce
inter-agency
battle on
the Middle East and Iraq”. That was “unavoidable if we are to
retain a handle
on what is
going on [in] areas of vital importance to our national interest.
But it does
mean that
we have to tread with the greatest care”.
66.
Sir
Christopher told the Inquiry, that he had been told by a senior
American official
“shortly
after Crawford” that there were problems with the UK’s “yes, but”
approach:
“the ‘yes’
was greedily devoured by the American Administration, but the
‘buts’ had kind
67.
In discussions
with Dr Rice on Iraq, Sir David told her that the UK’s “offer of
military
support for
a campaign against Saddam was firm. But we must go the UN
inspectors
route
first; we must stabilise Arab/Israel … and we must prepare public
opinion.”33
He was
assured that the UK would be brought into the planning process at a
very
early stage,
once such planning got under way.
68.
In a separate
report to Mr Blair, Sir David warned that, in the light of the
US
perception
that the UK was considering providing an armoured division, there
were
dangers
that the “moderates in Washington” were worried that “the hawks”
would
30
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 19 May 2002, ‘Visit to Washington: 17
May’.
31
Letter
Meyer to Manning, 15 May 2002, ‘Your Visit to
Washington’.
32
Public
hearing, 26 November 2009, page 64.
33
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 18 May 2002, ‘David Manning’s Visit to
Washington, 17 May; Iraq’.
15