6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
“Ridding
the world of Saddam would be an act of humanity. It is leaving him
there
that is in
truth inhumane.
“And if it
does come to this, let us be clear: we should be as committed to
the
humanitarian
task of rebuilding Iraq for the Iraqi people as we have been
to
removing
Saddam.”
456.
In
mid-February, DFID officials sought Ms Short’s views on how
DFID
should
deploy its limited resources and what balance to strike between
planning
for an
“exemplary role” in southern Iraq and supporting the UN and the
wider
international
effort throughout the country.
457.
Officials
recommended certain actions to ensure that DFID was
adequately
prepared
for a range of roles.
458.
Ms Short
rejected a number of her officials’ recommendations on
the
grounds
that they might imply that military action was a certainty or
presupposed
a
significant role for DFID to which it could not yet
commit.
459.
Ms Short
did so despite accepting that, as a consequence, DFID
would
not be
prepared for an immediate response in the event of military
action
or a humanitarian
crisis on the ground.
460.
Ms Short
withdrew her objections by early March.
461.
On 17
February, DFID officials advised Ms Short on the implications of
the
decisions
taken at Mr Blair’s meeting on 13 February.207
DFID needed
to balance the
decision
that the UK should take the lead on humanitarian issues in southern
Iraq with
its
commitment to support the international system, in particular the
UN, in humanitarian
work across
Iraq and the region. DFID needed to prioritise its “scarce human
and
financial
resources” between those activities.
462.
DFID officials
had discussed the idea of an “exemplary role” briefly with
senior
UK military
officers and the MOD, who were ready to contribute “in
circumstances
where the
military may be the only people able to deliver humanitarian
assistance, or
they are
needed to facilitate access by others”. The Chiefs of Staff would
discuss the
humanitarian
role of the UK military on 19 February. Officials recommended to Ms
Short
that, at
that meeting, DFID would need to give a clearer steer on the role
it expected to
play and
what it thought the military should do.
207
Minute
Conflict & Humanitarian Affairs Department to PS/Secretary of
State [DFID], 17 February 2003,
‘Iraq –
Contingency Planning: Deployment Plan’.
389