14.1 | Military equipment (post-conflict)

1282. An internal Army lessons learned report was published on 31 August 2010, known

as the “Barry Report”.669 It stated that one of the lessons for future transitions was to

increase, not decrease, the ISTAR requirement:

“As transition progresses and UK boots and eyes on the ground decrease, so there

is an increased requirement for ISTAR in order to maintain the same overall level

of situational awareness. The Iraq experience demonstrated that once we withdrew

to the COB we lost a very large part of our situational awareness. Supporting

indigenous forces with our ISTAR also enhances effectiveness and commanders’

prestige and thereby maintains our ability to influence.”

1283. On IDF, the Barry Report stated:

“In 2004 MND(SE) had predicted that the IDF threat would increase … the threat

was acknowledged but did not seem to result in structural force protection of our

bases for some time. Although some were in very robust buildings, such as Basra

Palace, the majority of troops on the COB remained in tented accommodation until

very late in the campaign …”

1284. The DOC’s final Op TELIC lessons report was endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff

on 17 March 2010.670 It stated that there had been a lack of an enduring intelligence

picture for “at least the first four years” of the campaign and that perhaps that stemmed

from “the very widely held view that, up to and throughout 2006 and into 2007, there

were insufficient ISTAR assets available to MND(SE), and hence by necessity they were

focused on maintaining as much of the day‑to‑day tactical picture as possible”.

1285. The DOC wrote that it had also been suggested “that rather than there not

being enough, the Coalition as a whole had sufficient ISTAR assets; but that due to

a lack of in‑depth understanding of the capability”, the effort was “mistakenly focused

on requesting ISTAR platforms rather than their product”. It continued:

“The situation was exacerbated by the lack of effective engagement by MND(SE)

with MNC‑I via the coalition chain of command. The result was increased requests

from theatre directly to the UK for additional national ISTAR assets, which were

eventually provided. Had the correct engagement of the in‑theatre chain of

command been followed this might have delivered the required increase in ISTAR

capability far sooner.”

1286. The DOC report offered the following lessons:

• “When tasking limited ISTAR assets sources, consideration of the creation and

maintenance of the strategic through to the tactical picture must be undertaken.”

• “When operating as part of a coalition, understanding the procedures to gain

access to coalition ISTAR assets are vital; defaulting to the national route, whilst

potentially easier, will probably not deliver as quickly.”

669 Report Land Command, 31 August 2010, ‘Operations in Iraq: An Analysis From a Land Perspective’.

670 Report DOC, 17 March 2010, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study Vol. 4’.

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