3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
this is the
time to rally to the flag’. People laughed but interestingly the
atmosphere
changed.
Sitting at the back I had thought to myself ‘This is going to be a
difficult
Cabinet’,
and it wasn’t.”132
438.
Asked by the
Inquiry why he had decided to continue the negotiations and
whether
that was
“not in particularly good faith”, Mr Blair
replied:
“No. It was
very simply this, that obviously this was a second best thing now …
but
what we
decided was … even if you can’t get the resolution because they
have
said they
will veto, nonetheless you would have some greater, if you like,
political
authority
if you could at least get a majority of members of the Security
Council to
say they
would agree such a resolution even vetoed.”133
439.
Asked whether
a vetoed resolution would have undermined the authority
for
military
action in resolution 1441, Mr Blair said:
“No, it
would not have undermined that because we were saying that we
accept
that we
believed we had authority in 1441, but it would have allowed us
politically to
say we had
the majority of the Security Council. So had we ended up in a
situation
where Chile
and Mexico had said ‘We are with you’. We would probably have
put
this
resolution down, had it vetoed.”134
440.
In a
statement on 13 March, Mr de Villepin rejected the UK’s
tests.
441.
In a statement
issued on 13 March, Mr de Villepin said that the UK
proposals
did “not
address the issues raised by the international
community”.135
The aim
was
“not to
grant Iraq a few extra days before embarking on a path leading to
the use of
force, but
to move resolutely forward on the peaceful disarmament route”.
Inspections
were “a
credible alternative to war” and were “producing results” as
Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei
had “pointed out in the 7 March report”. In the “spirit” of
resolution 1441,
France
wanted “a realistic timeframe in which to achieve effective
disarmament”.
Success
would “demand” Iraq’s “full and wholehearted
co-operation”.
442.
In subsequent
interviews for French media, Mr de Villepin stated that the
UK
proposal
embraced “the idea of an ultimatum, of the automaticity of the
recourse
to force”
which for France “was unacceptable”.136
He pointed
out that the US had
“a determining
role” as it was “maintaining that the die is cast” and was “intent
on
moving towards
a military intervention”.
132
Public
hearing, 19 January 2011, page 25.
133
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, page 106.
134
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 106-107.
135
Embassy of
the Republic of France in the UK, Iraq –
Statement by M. Dominique de Villepin, Minister
of Foreign
Affairs, Paris 13.03.2003.
136
Embassy of
the Republic of France in the UK, Iraq –
Interview given by M. Dominique de Villepin,
Minister of
Foreign Affairs, to French radio stations, Paris
13.03.2003’.
477