9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
Mr Prentice
described “clear signs that some in Maliki’s circle … saw no need
to give the
UK and
other non-US forces a role beyond 2008”.
108.
Ambassador
Crocker told Mr Prentice that, in his opinion, those views
were based
on
“ignorance of the breadth of the present UK role and on
overconfidence in the
capabilities
of the ISF”. He did not think that Prime Minister Maliki had a
clear position
yet on an
agreement with the UK. Mr Prentice considered that the US and
UK should
avoid
closing off any options.
109.
Mr Prentice
also described plans for Mr Day to visit Iraq with “a
non-paper which
set out
what we would require in terms of legal cover for UK forces post
Chapter VII and
asked a
number of open-ended questions” to discuss with the Iraqi
Government.
110.
On 8 July, the
British Embassy Office Basra reported that the operational
phase
of Charge
of the Knights had ended.38
Phase XV,
an influence/information campaign,
was in the
initial planning stage.
111.
On 9 July a
CIG provided a “sitrep on the electoral process”.39
112.
The CIG judged
that for provincial elections to be held before the end of 2008,
the
relevant
legislation needed to be passed by the end of July. The key issues
still being
debated
were:
•
whether the
elections would run on an open list (allowing voters to
back
individual
candidates) or a closed one (limiting choices to political
parties); and
•
whether the
elections should be held simultaneously across all 18
provinces.
113.
Parties that
stood to lose out in the elections had been privately lobbying for
a
closed
list, or a hybrid between the two systems, but the Iraqi Government
favoured
an open
list system. Prime Minister Maliki favoured staggered elections,
while the
Independent
High Electoral Commission, whose job it was to oversee and
manage
the elections,
favoured a simultaneous approach.
114.
The CIG
considered that the elections had the potential to support the
national
reconciliation
process by providing those who had been excluded from power
with
a means of
entering the political process. Greater participation from OMS
(which
had
boycotted the last elections), new Sunni political parties, the
Sunni Arab Tribal
“awakening”
groups and a range of independent candidates was expected to
improve
the
representativeness of local councils.
115.
The CIG
reported that OMS had not registered as a political party, on the
grounds
that
Muqtada al-Sadr believed that participation would be tantamount to
support for the
“occupation”.
However, the media had reported that OMS would field
“independent”
Sadrist
candidates on other parties’ lists.
38
eGram
26653/08 Basra to FCO London, 8 July 2008, ‘Basra: Weekly
Update’.
39
CIG Current
Assessment Note, 9 July 2008, ‘The Iraqi Provincial
Elections’.
399