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1.2  |  Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September 2001
107.  Mr Cook stated that re-establishing inspections “should not be a test of the success
of our policy, as this would require Saddam’s agreement”.
108.  Mr Cook and Secretary Powell also discussed NFZs and agreed that US and UK
“officials should meet very soon”. Secretary Powell planned to visit the region at the
end of February.
109.  In a subsequent meeting with US Vice President Dick Cheney, Mr Cook said
that he had agreed with Secretary Powell that the focus should be put back on
Saddam Hussein’s responsibility for the suffering of the Iraqi people, and his interest
in acquiring WMD.62
110.  Reporting on his visit to Washington to Cabinet on 8 February, Mr Cook stated
that the new foreign policy team in the US was “prepared to explore new ideas on Iraq,
where they understood the need to regain the moral high ground”.63
111.  In the subsequent discussion, it was pointed out that it was a good time to review
policy on Iraq because the UK Government was “losing the propaganda battle”.
112.  In advance of Mr Blair’s meeting with Mr Jacques Chirac, the French President, at
the UK/French Summit on 9 February, the FCO advised Mr Sawers that:
“The French have long argued that the key to enticing Iraq into co-operation and
moving forward on sanctions is through ‘clarification’ of SCR 1284. An important
element of this would be elaboration of the post-suspension modalities. The French
are keen to revive bilateral talks on this topic which started promisingly 18 months
ago but which tailed off as the US election approached and Iraq was put on the
back burner.”64
113.  The FCO advised that Mr Blair should take a fairly non-committal line at
the Summit.
114.  The Inquiry has not seen a record of Mr Blair’s discussions with President Chirac at
the Summit.
115.  The FCO’s briefing for Mr Cook’s meeting with Mr Hubert Vedrine, the French
Foreign Minister, at the Summit stated that Mr Vedrine was openly hostile to sanctions,
which he had described as “cruel and ineffective”, and that he regarded the NFZs
as “useless”.65
116.  In their meeting, Mr Cook encouraged Mr Vedrine to work with the US and the UK
on Iraq.66
62  Telegram 135 Washington to FCO London, 7 February 2001, ‘Meeting with Vice President Cheney,
6 February’.
63  Cabinet Conclusions, 8 February 2001.
64  Letter Sedwill to Sawers, 8 February 2001, ‘UK/French Summit, Cahors: Iraq’.
65  Minute FCO [junior official] to PS [FCO], 8 February 2001, ‘Iraq: UK/French Summit: Briefing for
Secretary of State’ attaching Briefing, [undated], ‘Iraq: UK/French Summit: Briefing for Secretary of State:
9 February’.
66  Telegram 036 FCO London to Paris, 9 February 2001, ‘Foreign Secretary’s Tete-a-Tete with French
Foreign Minister, 9 February’.
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