6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
•
Vetting
policy. “Is it the US aim to de-Saddam, or de-Ba’ath Iraq? If the
latter,
how much of
the party structure do we wish to remove? In the short term, and
in
the long
term? What level of compromise/co-operation with Iraqi officialdom
will
be
necessary and/or acceptable in the early stages of Phase IV?
Depending on
the US
intention, can they provide UK forces with means of identifying
particular
officials
for removal from office or detention? How will the Coalition
process
those
removed from office? … How will government functions be maintained
if
key
officials are removed?”
•
Oil. The UK
would press for transparency of oil management, greater
UN
involvement
than was envisaged and early setting of the date for handing
control
of
oilfields back to Iraq.
•
National
governance. A
decision on the final shape of an Iraq administration
(the
end state)
was of “critical importance” to the earliest phases of the military
effort.
•
Economic
policy. What were the plans for preventing macroeconomic
collapse?
•
SSR. What
would the new security apparatus look like? At a tactical level,
UK
forces
needed guidance on how to treat different parts of the Iraqi
security
infrastructure
as they encountered them.
•
Humanitarian.
The source of the extra resources needed by the UK
military
to deliver
humanitarian assistance in the absence of a significant NGO or
UN
presence
was not known and there was no plan for the worst case
scenario.
342.
It is not
clear whether the FCO or Cabinet Office saw the MOD
briefing.
343.
Separately,
Mr Drummond sent Mr Lee “key messages” on post-conflict
Iraq for
Mr Hoon
to use with Secretary Rumsfeld and for Sir David Manning to use
with Dr Rice
later in
the week.163
The
messages, agreed by officials in other departments and
No.10,
included
material on the importance of securing a UN mandate to legitimise
international
rule,
establishing a substantial UN role in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq,
engaging IFIs
to plan
economic reconstruction, avoiding the perception of a UK/US “oil
grab” and
securing “a
level-playing field for UK business in oil and other
areas”.
344.
The proposed
message on dismantling the Iraqi regime was:
“Must
detain senior leadership and leading members of Saddam’s security
forces
and put
them through proper legal process. But we will need Iraqi
technocrats, who
may have
gone along with Saddam’s regime, to run the country. Our officials
are
talking
about handling war criminals etc. Must have an agreed policy this
month.”
345.
It is unclear
whether the reference to “an agreed policy” referred to war
criminals,
technocrats,
or both.
163
Letter
Drummond to Lee, 11 February 2003, ‘Iraq Post Conflict: Key
Messages’ attaching Paper
Cabinet Office,
11 February 2003, ‘Iraq Post Conflict: Key Messages’.
369