The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
83.
Mr Blair
and President Bush discussed de‑Ba’athification briefly when they
spoke
by
telephone on 6 June.78
Mr Blair
argued that the principle was right, but needed
to be
applied flexibly: “we should neither undermine public services by
sacking key
technocrats
nor allow a class of resentful and desperate ex Ba’athists to build
up.”
84.
In his
book State of
Denial Mr Bob
Woodward described General Jay Garner,
the former
Head of ORHA, telling Secretary Rumsfeld in June 2003 that the
extent
of
de‑Ba’athification had been one of three “terrible mistakes” made
in Iraq.79
In
Gen Garner’s
view, those mistakes were still reversible. Secretary Rumsfeld is
reported
to have
responded: “We’re not going to go back.” Gen Garner did not
make the same
point in
person to President Bush.
85.
One of the
UK’s priorities for the first 30 days of the CPA, produced by the
IPU and
circulated
by Mr Straw on 5 June, was the need for:
“… a
pragmatic approach to dismantling the Ba’ath Party and the security
apparatus.
We need to
destroy the system, not the people. Need to give people reasons to
work
with us,
not against us: the prospect of work, of a basic income, the chance
to find a
place in
the new Iraq.”80
86.
Discussion at
a meeting chaired by Mr Blair on 6 June (see Section 9.2)
suggested
that this
was not being achieved.81
In both
Baghdad and Basra de‑Ba’athification was
listed as
one factor in security problems.
87.
On 9 June,
Sir David Manning reported to Mr Straw’s Principal
Private Secretary
that he had
told Dr Rice that:
“… she
should look again at the de‑Ba’athification programme. The
draconian way in
which it
was being applied risked acting as a recruiting sergeant for the
opposition. It
had been
right to take a tough line on the Ba’ath party; but it would be
sensible now
to impose
it flexibly. We should adopt the approach that those who were not
against
us, were
with us; rather than act as though we thought those who were not
obviously
with us
were against us.”82
88.
On 17 June,
instructions from the IPU to Mr Sawers reflected a mounting
concern
about the
extent of UK influence on decision‑making generally within the
CPA.83
The
IPU
wrote:
“Ministers
remain deeply concerned about the lack of effective joint‑decision
making
with the
US. With many decisions now being made in Baghdad, the ideal
solution
78
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 6 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 6 June’.
79
Woodward
B. State of
Denial. Simon &
Schuster UK Ltd, 2006.
80
Minute
Straw to
Blair, 5 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Winning the Peace’, attaching ‘Iraq
Reconstruction:
30 Day
priorities, 5 July 2003’.
81
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 6 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting, 6
June’.
82
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 9 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi
Rice’.
83
Telegram 13
FCO London to IraqRep, 17 June 2003, ‘Iraq:
Priorities’.
20