3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
78.
Mr Mohammed
Aldouri, Iraqi Permanent Representative to UN, challenged
the
“incorrect
allegations” in Secretary Powell statement and reiterated that Iraq
had no
weapons of
mass destruction. He stated that inspectors had visited the sites
identified
in US
and UK reports in September and October and “none of the
allegations” were true.
He also
rebutted statements made by President Bush in his State of the
Union Address
on 28
January (see Section 3.6).
79.
Mr Aldouri
reaffirmed Iraq’s commitment to pro-active co-operation with
the
inspectors
so that they could verify that Iraq was free of weapons of mass
destruction,
sanctions
could be lifted, and progress could be made on regional security by
ridding
the whole
Middle East of WMD.
80.
Reporting on
the discussion, Sir Jeremy Greenstock wrote that
Mr Straw
and Ms Ana
Palacio, the Spanish Foreign Minister, had strongly
supported
Secretary Powell’s
presentation and Mrs Soledad Alvear, the Chilean Foreign
Minister,
had made a
“noticeably stronger intervention”.19
Most other
countries had, however,
argued for
more time.
81.
Sir Jeremy
commented:
“A dramatic
day. Powell’s presentation was impressive – at the higher end
of
expectations.
It has pushed the rock further up the hill. It has also helpfully
raised
the bar
of inspections by underlining that the Iraqis will need to answer
real
questions
about their activities if they are to satisfy the inspectors
…
“But I do
not think it was decisive. Most Council members reiterated
familiar
positions.
The most significant shift was the … Chileans. French ideas … had
an air
of
desperation about them. But they could be the straw which many in
the Council
attempt to
grasp as the option other than war.”
82.
Sir Jeremy
told the Inquiry that Secretary Powell had given:
“… an
extremely impressive presentation of the evidence we had of Iraqi
WMD, but
it was not
decisive. There wasn’t a smoking gun there in the presentation.
There
hadn’t been
a smoking gun presented by the inspectors to the Security Council,
and
it seemed
to many members of the Security Council that Secretary Powell was
trying
too hard to
establish a case for which there was no clear proof … it didn’t
convert
83.
President Bush
wrote:
“Colin’s
presentation was exhaustive, eloquent and persuasive. Coming
against
the
backdrop of Saddam’s defiance of the weapons inspectors, it had a
profound
19
Telegram
215 UKMIS New York to FCO London. 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Powell’s
Presentation
to the Council’.
20
Public
hearing, 27 November 2009, pages 86-87.
193