The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
698.
The report
concluded by saying that “the lack of faith in the UOR process”
and
the suggestion
of a “fundamental mismatch” between theatre’s requirements and
the
“ECC/IPTs
endeavours to deliver the perfect capability in a more extended
timeframe
was
concerning”. Lord Drayson asked for advice, by 10 April, from
Maj Gen Figgures
on how to
address that and for him and the Chief of Defence Materiel “to
reinforce the
urgency
that everyone should attach to delivering UORs”.
699.
In his
evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee on 20 March
about
UK
operations in Afghanistan, Lt Gen Houghton said that the
deployment of Mastiff and
Vector was
expected to be complete by the end of autumn.370
He said
that, by that time,
all Snatch
vehicles would have been removed from theatre.
700.
On 18 May,
Lord Drayson was advised that a total of 49 operational
Mastiff
vehicles
out of 108 had been delivered so far: 14 in Iraq, 16 in Afghanistan
and 19
Following
Lord Drayson’s request for advice on how to address the
“fundamental
mismatch”
between theatre’s requirements and the delivery of capability,
Lt Gen Figgures
advised on
4 April that the UOR process continued to be “agile and reactive,
with an
average of
just seven months between the PJHQ endorsement of a requirement and
the
in‑service
date of the UOR‑ed equipment”.372
Those seven
months included:
•
identification
of a solution;
•
the drafting
and approval of a business case;
•
the placing of
a contract;
•
the
manufacture and/or integration of the equipment; and
•
the delivery
of that equipment to theatre.
Lt Gen Figgures
acknowledged the rise in USURs during FY 2006/07 and stated
that
“the more
heavily loaded” teams, the Departments of Equipment Capability
(DECs) and
Directorate
of Capabilities Resources and Scrutiny (DCRS), had augmented their
staff
“so as to
be able to continue to react rapidly to the increase in volume and
not slow the
process
down”.
Time was
“the key driver for UORs” and it was “universally accepted” that
UORs only had
to meet “an
80+ percent solution”, on the basis that it was “preferable to
rapidly fill the
capability
gap that exists in theatre rather than achieve a technically
perfect outcome”.
Considering
potential reasons for delay, Lt Gen Figgures wrote that
there had been
“a gradual
evolution” in the type of UORs being submitted over recent months
from
“traditional”
UORs that sought to modify or enhance existing equipment to
UORs
“asking for
entirely new systems” which inevitably would take longer to
deliver.
370
Thirteenth
Report of the House of Commons Defence Committee, Session
2006‑07, UK
operations
in Afghanistan, HC
408.
371
Minute SO1
DCC [DEC(GM)], 18 May 2007, ‘Medium Protected Patrol Vehicle
Mastiff’.
372
Minute
DCDS(EC) to PS/Min(DES), 4 April 2007, Minister(DES) Visit to Iraq
– Equipment Issues’.
120