The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

519. The Treasury told the Inquiry that it has no record of any department requesting

that allocation.313

520. On the same day, a Treasury official advised Mr Boateng that, as DFID still

had £95m available for humanitarian work, and given that the UN did not yet have a

presence on the ground in Iraq and the reconstruction effort had not yet started, he

should write to Ms Short “to impose some safeguards” on the additional US$100m.314

521. Mr Boateng wrote to Ms Short on 15 April to clarify how DFID could access those

funds.315 He understood that DFID did not need the additional funds immediately, given

that humanitarian and reconstruction work was at a very early stage and that DFID had

£95m of uncommitted resources. He fully expected DFID to bid for additional funding for

Iraq “in the next few months”. Mr Boateng asked that, before DFID looked to access the

new funds, Ms Short should write to him setting out her proposals for how the additional

funding would be spent.

522. Ms Short agreed on 23 April that other departments should be given access to the

US$100m allocation, to pay for their secondments to the US‑led Office of Reconstruction

and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).316 That would mean that they, rather than DFID,

would have to pass the Treasury’s tests on value for money and effectiveness.

523. Mr Boateng wrote to Mr Straw on 2 May to endorse the “broad consensus” that

£4.8m of the US$100m/£60m allocation should be ring‑fenced for the inter-departmental

Iraq Planning Unit (IPU), to cover the cost of UK secondees to ORHA.317

524. On 2 May, Ms Short’s Private Secretary sent Mr Rycroft an “Interim DFID

Strategy” for the next three to six months as Iraq transitioned from “relief/recovery

to reconstruction”.318

525. The strategy stated that the expected humanitarian crisis had not materialised, and

set out the “immediate recovery tasks” and “broader [reconstruction] agenda” that now

needed to be addressed.

526. The strategy stated that DFID had earmarked £210m for “relief, recovery and

reconstruction activities” in the current financial year (2003/04). That allocation

comprised the £90m provided by DFID from its own resources and the £120m provided

from the Central Reserve on 27 March, for humanitarian assistance. The US$100m

announced by Mr Brown on 9 April had been “earmarked” for DFID; it had subsequently

been agreed that the costs of secondments to ORHA could be met from that allocation.

313 Email Treasury [junior official] to Iraq Inquiry [junior official], 17 April 2014, ‘Further Queries Relating

to Resources’.

314 Minute Treasury [junior official] to Chief Secretary, 9 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Budget Funding’.

315 Letter Boateng to Short, 15 April 2003, ‘Budget Announcement on Iraq’.

316 Minute Bewes to Miller, 24 April 2003, ‘Iraq: 23 April’.

317 Letter Boateng to Straw, 2 May 2003, ‘Funding ORHA Secondees’.

318 Letter Bewes to Rycroft, 2 May 2003, ‘Iraq Rehabilitation’ attaching Paper DFID, [undated], ‘Iraq: Interim

DFID Strategy’.

530