The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
3 Commando
Brigade would seize the oil infrastructure on the al-Faw
Peninsula,
Umm Qasr
port, and set the conditions for Coalition mine
countermeasures
operations
and the clearance of the Khawr Abd Allah waterway.
•
16 Air
Assault Brigade and 7 Armoured Brigade would relieve US
forces:
16 Air Assault
Brigade would assume responsibility for the security of
the
Rumaylah
oilfields and 7 Armoured Brigade would be responsible for
the
isolation
of Basra, securing az-Zubayr, and the protection of oil
infrastructure
within its
boundaries.
•
Security of
Basra International Airport and Basra itself were described
as
“be
prepared to” tasks.
495.
Lt Gen Reith
commented:
“Critically,
this plan only really sees 3 Cdo Bde being committed to
combat
operations
with the net effect … that the balance of the UK land element may
be
largely
involved in Phase IV operations unless there is some form of egress
from
Basra or
movement to the south or west by 6 Armd Div [Iraqi
forces].”
496.
Lt Gen Reith
summarised that the plan:
“… probably
doesn’t appropriately reflect the level of our commitment of
ground
forces.
Moreover, the whole issue of teeing soldiers up for combat
operations must,
potentially,
be difficult on the basis of the tasks currently on offer for 7 and
16 Bdes.
In other
words, whilst the task is eminently manageable, it probably
represents,
for the
Army, a poor return, militarily, on the forces
committed.”
497.
Lt Gen Reith
addressed the advantages and disadvantages of “UK ownership
of
its full AO
from the start”. Under the existing Base Plan, the UK AO would
expand into
space
vacated by US forces as they moved north and UK forces would not be
able to
shape their
own Phase IV AOR. Lt Gen Reith explained that one of the
contingency
plans
already worked up by the Land Component Command (LCC) assumed full
UK
ownership
of its AO from the start. It would see all three UK brigades
“potentially being
committed
to combat operations and being responsible for defeating all enemy
forces …
This plan
also allows UK forces to shape the AO in Phase III for Phase IV by
employing
an
appropriate balance of kinetic and non-kinetic
effect.”
498.
Lt Gen Reith
concluded: “There can be no doubt at all that this represents a
far
better
option for UK forces than the Base Plan”.
499.
In the second
paper, Lt Gen Reith explained that his forthcoming
meetings
with Lt Gen
McKiernan and others would “almost certainly be the last chance
that
the
operational commanders will have to discuss the plan face to face
before ground
operations
commence”. US commanders were likely to press him on UK
land
contributions
beyond the provisions in the Base Plan.
462