The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
RAF Jaguars
flying reconnaissance operations in the northern NFZ did not carry
or
drop
air‑to-ground ordnance, but RAF Tornado aircraft in the southern
NFZ did so on
numerous
occasions.
757.
Although Iraq
did not succeed in shooting down an aircraft the risk was
taken
extremely
seriously by both the US and the UK. That raised a number of
serious issues
about the
extent of the actions which could be taken in self-defence and the
nature of
operations
to rescue any downed aircrew. Those are addressed in Section
1.2.
758.
The Butler
Report stated that a JIC Assessment on 7 January 1999 had
reached
“somewhat
firmer judgements than in 1997” that:
•
“Following the
1991 Gulf War Iraq concealed BW [biological warfare]
production
equipment,
stocks of agents and perhaps even BW weapons …”
•
“… Iraq has
sufficient expertise, equipment, and materials to produce
BW
agents
within weeks.” 298
759.
The Butler
Review was told that the reason for shortening the timescales
for
production
of biological agent to “within weeks” was “intelligence of Iraqi
requests for
large
quantities of growth media”, which was “judged to be greatly in
excess of Iraq’s
likely
legitimate requirements”.299
But it was
“not known” if Iraq had actually obtained
the growth
media.
760.
Mr Butler
produced two reports on 25 January 1999, one on the
disarmament of
Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction and one on monitoring and verification,
which were
formally
circulated to the Security Council on
29 January.300
761.
The report on
disarmament described the work of UNSCOM since 1991 and
its
methodology,
and set out “material balances” for the proscribed missile,
chemical and
biological
weapons in three detailed annexes. It also included an annex “on
actions by
Iraq to
obstruct disarmament”.
762.
The report
drew a distinction between UNSCOM’s activities before and
after
Lt Gen
Kamil’s departure from Iraq in August 1995, commenting that Iraq’s
subsequent
disclosures:
“…
indicated that, during the first four years of its activities, the
Commission had
been very
substantially misled by Iraq both in terms of its understanding of
Iraq’s
298
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
page
58.
299
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
page
59.
300
UN Security
Council, 29 January 1999, ‘Letter dated 25 January 1999
from the Executive Chairman of
the Special
Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to
paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security
Council
resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security
Council’ (S/1999/94).
166