The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
funding that
will … cover the costs of being an Occupying Power until other
sources
49.
The Inquiry
has seen no indications that any work was done to identify an
alternative
source of
funding. The UK’s assumption remained that the US/CPA should
provide
funding for
the South.
50.
Section 9.8
concludes that, from early July, security was seen in Whitehall as
the
key
concern. A circular analysis began to develop, in which progress on
reconstruction
required
security to be improved, and improved security required the consent
generated
by
reconstruction.
51.
Cabinet agreed
on 3 July that the UK should make CPA(South) “a
model”.15
What
that meant,
and what resources might be required to realise it, was not
specified or
recognised
as an issue. It was ill‑advised to set ambitious objectives without
any plan or
commitment
of resources for meeting them.
52.
By 9 July, Sir
Michael Jay had agreed with FCO officials that a British official
should
replace
Ambassador Olsen as Head of CPA(South), if he decided to
resign.
53.
Ministers
agreed the following day that the UK should offer to replace
Ambassador
Olsen with
a British official.
54.
Although the
significant strategic, resource and reputational implications of
such a
decision
had been identified in March and April 2003, there are no
indications that those
assessments
were reviewed, or that any arrangements were to put in place to
support a
British
Head of CPA(South) and, more broadly, the UK’s leadership of
CPA(South).
55.
Sir Hilary
Synnott arrived in Basra on 30 July to take up post as Head
of
CPA(South).
Sir Hilary wrote in his memoir that his arrival, along with the
British military
command of
MND(SE), established “some sort of British Fiefdom” in the South,
but one
which he
saw as “still entirely dependent on American resources for its
lifeblood”.16
56.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock, the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Iraq
from
September
2003 to March 2004, told the Inquiry that there was a “separation
in the
American
mind between the British area and the rest of Iraq, which was their
area”.17
Sir Jeremy
added that that separation was reflected in the US resources
available for
the South:
“The Americans said let the Brits look after
Basra.”18
14 Annotated
Agenda, 12 June 2003 Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting
attaching Paper
DFID/MOD,
11 June 2003, ‘UK Support to the CPA South Area – Next
Steps’.
15
Cabinet
Conclusions, 3 July 2003.
16
Synnott
H. Bad Days in
Basra: My Turbulent Time as Britain’s Man in Southern
Iraq. I B
Tauris & Co Ltd.,
2008.
17
Public
hearing, 15 December 2009, page 94.
18
Private
hearing, 26 May 2010, page 54.
536