2 |
Decision-making within government
230.
Mr Ricketts
informed Mr Chaplin on 4 February that he had agreed
with
Sir Michael Jay
and Mr Ehrman that:
“… the FCO
should consolidate the lead we have already taken in this
area
[post‑conflict
issues] with the work that Dominick Chilcott has been doing
under
your supervision.
“I am sure
that this work will now grow fast, particularly with the prospect
of
the UK
inheriting responsibility for a good slice of southern Iraq
following a
231.
Mr Bowen
chaired a meeting in the Cabinet Office on 4 February, attended
by
the FCO,
MOD and DFID, at which it was decided to set up an
inter-departmental
(FCO, MOD
and DFID) unit, headed by an FCO official, Mr Chilcott, to “prepare
for
the aftermath
in practical operational terms”.133
Wider
strategy would continue to be
co‑ordinated
through the AHGI.
232.
In a letter to
Mr Ehrman recording the outcome of the meeting, Mr
Bowen
explained
that there was “a good deal of uncertainty about American
intentions in
administering
Iraq in the event of (and after) hostilities to remove Saddam
Hussein’s
regime”.
Meetings in Washington that week were likely to bring greater
clarity but were
unlikely to
produce decisions.
233.
Mr Bowen
reported that the meeting had recognised that:
“… even if
some of the big strategic issues remained unresolved, a lot of
detailed
management
issues were likely to arise. Much was likely to emanate
from
CENTCOM,
which had the prospectively imminent task of administering a
country
whose
leadership had been removed. With this in mind we agreed that we
should
set up an
Iraq Operational Policy Unit with contributions from the FCO,
DFID
and MOD …
My view was that we needed an integrated unit with high
calibre
representation
to work through the sort of issues that would confront the
Coalition
on the ‘day
after’. Their
initial remit would be to develop policy guidance to
enable the
administration of Iraq pending the appointment of a
transitional
civil
administration, consistent as far as possible with the longer term
vision
for the future
of Iraq. They would
need to work their way, with the US, through
issues as
diverse as humanitarian relief, policing, administration of
justice, local
government
and provision of utilities, environmental recovery and priorities
for the
return to
normality. The view we all reached was that this unit ought to be
up and
running
from Monday 10 February … It will need staff who think
strategically and
operationally
and have some background in state reconstruction from other
cases
(in order
to feed in the lessons of eg Kosovo and Afghanistan).”
132
Minute
Ricketts to Chaplin, 4 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Day After
Planning’.
133
Letter
Bowen to Ehrman, 5 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Operational Policy
Unit’.
303