4.4 | The search for WMD

731. Mr Scarlett wrote that Mr Duelfer had included only a few of the UK’s suggestions

and seemed to be trying to avoid going into detail, especially if it came from Dr Kay’s

Interim Report. There were “numerous instances” where Mr Duelfer could have brought

out breaches of resolutions, but did not.

732. Mr Scarlett concluded:

“Overall, this is a carefully written, ‘strategic’ document designed to restore or to

reinforce the credibility of the ISG and to lay the groundwork for future conclusions in

a final report …”

733. Addressing tactics, Mr Scarlett added:

“We will concentrate on repeating our previous proposals for inclusion of further

detail … We will also point up the many opportunities for emphasising breaches of

UNSCRs …”

734. Mr Scarlett reported that his US interlocutors were:

“… very clear that ‘comments’ must come from the intelligence community and not

the policy makers … Duelfer is already feeling sensitive to ‘pressure’ from London …”

735. Mr Blair and President Bush discussed the impact of the next ISG interim report

on 16 March.410 Mr Blair said that the first draft was better than expected. Although it

contained nothing completely new, it showed that Iraq had been in clear breach of UN

resolutions. It was important to keep some of the “colour” in the report, but even as it

stood it was quite powerful: “it helped attack the argument that the Coalition should find

physical evidence or the war was unjustified”.

736. Mr Blair chaired a meeting to discuss the ISG on 17 March, attended by

Mr Scarlett, Mr Howard, Mr Dowse, a senior SIS official and officials from No.10.411

737. In response to Mr Scarlett’s advice on the timetable for the next interim report,

Mr Blair commented:

“There could be no question of our seeking to influence the material in the report.

Mr Duelfer must set out the facts as he saw them.

“But (a) an interim report was necessary (b) the material should be set out clearly

(c) presentation of the report was important.”

410 Letter Cannon to Adams, 16 March 2004, ‘Iraq WMD: Prime Minister’s Video-conference with President

Bush, 16 March’.

411 Minute Cannon to Scarlett, 18 March 2004, ‘Iraq Survey Group’.

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