4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
•
There was a
“further risk … that CBW could become available to
extremist
groups
either as a last vindictive act by Saddam, or through the loss of
control
in the
final days of his regime”.
•
Two recent
reports suggested that “some or all” of Iraq’s Al Hussein
missiles
“were
disassembled to hide them from inspectors. It would take Iraq at
least
several
days to reassemble the missiles once they decided to do
so.”
480.
Sir John
Scarlett told the Inquiry that an Intelligence Update produced on
10 March
had
referred to a report issued on 7 March:
“…
essentially saying that Iraq had no missiles which could reach
Israel and none
which could
carry germ or biological weapons.
“The
leadership had ordered the dismantlement of the missiles known as
Al Hussein
… to avoid
discovery and they thought they could be quickly
re-assembled. The JIC
had over
many months throughout this period reported the assessed
existence
of these
missiles … But all along, it had been reported that they had
been
disassembled
and concealed.
…
“The
Defence Intelligence Staff advised … that … it might be possible to
reassemble
[the
missiles] in one or two days. But if it was very complex
disassembly it would
be longer.
“SIS
advised that the reference to ‘germ and biological’ might also
refer to chemical,
just from
the context, although that was speculative.”178
481.
Sir John
Scarlett also told the Inquiry that, on 17 March:
“…
intelligence was received that chemical weapons had been
disassembled
and
dispersed and would be difficult to reassemble. Saddam had not yet
ordered
reassembly
nor, indeed, asked about chemical weapons.”179
482.
Sir John added
that the two reports:
“… were
assessed in the context of the policy of dispersal and
concealment.
They were
not understood to be an indication that chemical and biological
weapons
did not
exist. Indeed they didn’t say that but … it was clear … that they
might be
difficult
to find.
“Previous
reporting and updates had already reported separately on the
difficulty
that Iraq
was having or was reported to have in developing or redeveloping
chemical
warheads
for ballistic missiles … An update at the end of December had noted
…
178
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 44-45.
179
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 45-46.
377