The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
41.
In relation to
the preparation of the UK dossier, Secretary Powell said “he was
laying
less stress
on (disputable) dossiers and more on the fact that Saddam had
(indisputably)
violated
SCRs for the last 11 years”.
42.
Mr Straw
and Secretary Powell also discussed whether to produce two
resolutions.
Mr Straw
“pointed out that … would both fulfil President Bush’s promise and
help Villepin
[Mr Dominique
de Villepin, the French Foreign Minister] off a hook”. The UK
preference
was for a
second resolution, addressing other problems with Iraq including
terrorism,
to be
tabled later “so as not to blur the focus on WMD”.
43.
Mr Straw
and Secretary Powell were reported to have agreed that “we will
only get
a peaceful
resolution if we prepare for war”.
44.
Mr Simon
McDonald, Mr Straw’s Principal Private Secretary, sent a
separate letter
to Sir
David Manning reporting that, at the end of the discussion,
Mr Straw and Secretary
Powell had
had a private word to discuss US uncertainty about Mr Blair’s
position on
the
proposal for a comprehensive declaration.11
Mr McDonald
advised Sir David that
Mr Straw
had concluded “we need to incorporate a declaration within our
approach but
not in such
a way that it can be used as a casus belli”.
45.
Mr Straw
also discussed possible resolutions with Mr Igor Ivanov, the
Russian
Foreign
Minister, including whether, if Baghdad offered to allow the
inspectors to resume
their work,
a new resolution would be needed.12
46.
Mr Ivanov
warned Mr Straw not to repeat the actions of Operation Desert
Fox
(in December
1998) or Kosovo (in 1999).
47.
In parallel
with negotiations on the content of the UN resolution,
preparations
to publish
the Iraq dossier continued.
48.
Mr Blair
saw the purpose of the dossier as making the case for the
return
of inspectors
with a tough regime.
49.
In a note to
No.10 officials covering a range of issues on 15 September,
Mr Blair
wrote:
“The
dossier is crucial. The expectations must be right. Remember the
case we
need to
make is for the return of a tough inspection regime, not that he is
about
to launch a
strike. In my view, advice to me from the JIC is sufficiently
persuasive.
We also
need to decide what we can show key politicians here and in the EU;
early
sharing of
the info. will go down well and show willing.”13
11
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 17 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.
12
Telegram
[un‑numbered] UKMIS New York to FCO London, 16 September 2002,
‘Foreign Secretary’s
Meeting
with Russian Foreign Minister: Iraq’.
13
Note Blair
[to No.10 officials], 15 September 2002, [extract
‘Iraq’].
208