The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
operation
in March 2008 to drive Shia militias out of Basra, was there a
strategic context
in which
the effectiveness of UK civilians in the South was no longer
determined by the
security
threat and the availability of protective measures.
60.
In the absence
of a cross-government framework for managing risk, there was
no
overarching
consideration of the security assets needed for civilians to do
their jobs
effectively,
which UK military assets should be assigned to protect civilians
and what
constituted
an appropriate level of expenditure on protective security in the
particular
circumstances
of Iraq.
61.
Sections 6.4
and 6.5 address the shortcomings in UK civilian–military
co-ordination
during
pre-invasion planning and preparation for post-conflict
Iraq.
62.
Those
shortcomings persisted after the invasion.
63.
On 11 April
2003, shortly before the opening of the British Office Baghdad,
officials
advised Mr
Straw that no decision had been taken on how to guard the
compound
perimeter.
The MOD was considering the issue, but would “take some persuasion
to
redeploy to
Baghdad from the South”.22
64.
On 15 July
2005, the Iraq Strategy Group (ISG) discussed the first draft of a
paper
to be
signed by Dr John Reid, the Defence Secretary, on the planned
drawdown of UK
military
forces from southern Iraq. The ISG concluded that the draft, which
made no
reference
to the potential consequences of the drawdown for civilian
activities, needed to
cover more
clearly the implications for other government departments and
international
actors.
65.
In the revised
paper, Dr Reid stated that, although the drawdown was likely to
result
in a
significant cost saving to the military, other departments
operating in Iraq might face
increased
security costs as they were “forced to seek commercial alternatives
to military
force
protection”.23
No
alternatives were proposed.
66.
On 30
September 2005, a joint FCO/MOD/DFID paper recommended
the
allocation of
additional resources to security, including UK military
resources.
A No.10 official
told Mr Blair that Dr Reid did not support the
proposal.
67.
In October
2005, Dr Reid sought approval to procure a counter-measure to
the
threat
posed to UK troops by Improvised Explosive Devices.24
Ten days
later, Mr Hilary
Benn, the
International Development Secretary, expressed support for the
proposal,
pointing
out that it would also “significantly reduce the current threat
against UK forces
and DFID
staff”.
22
Minute Gray
to Private Secretary [FCO], 11 April 2003, ‘Baghdad: Preparing to
Open’.
23
Paper
Secretary of State for Defence, 18 July 2005, ‘Operational
Transition in Iraq’.
24
Letter Reid
to Browne, 31 October 2005, ‘Iraq UORs: M*’.
420