9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
516.
Mr Chaplin
told the Inquiry that Dr Allawi was seen as “a genuinely secular
figure
who was
Shia but not sectarian, seen as non‑ideological; a tough man,
someone who
would have
some credibility with the military”.281
For these
reasons, Mr Asquith told
the
Inquiry, it had been the view of “quite a large number, yes, from
the Prime Minister
downwards”
that it would have been better if Dr Allawi had stayed in
government.
517.
Mr Blair
telephoned Dr Allawi on 14 March and encouraged him to remain
in
518.
The TNA met
for the first time on 16 March.284
519.
Mr Chaplin
reported concerns about the impact of the delay in forming the
ITG:
“… the
longer the delay, the more frustrations grow and goodwill between
the parties
dissipates
… We have continued to press all our contacts hard to conclude
their
negotiations,
at least on the core package, before the inevitable break for
Kurdish
New Year on
21 March … pointing to the loss of credibility both
internationally
and
domestically … The parties assure us that they are keen to conclude
their
negotiations,
and intend to wrap up a deal by the end of March at the latest. If
they
show signs
of overshooting that target as well, we may need to step up the
pressure
with some
co-ordinated high level UK/US messages.”285
520.
On 18 March,
Mr Blair reminded Mr Quarrey: “I need J[ack] S[traw] to do me a
note
each week
on progress (to keep him at it).”286
521.
Mr Straw’s
first report to Mr Blair, dated 24 March, covered the first
three
meetings287
of the Ad
Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq.288
He
summarised their content as:
“The shape
of an early Iraqi statement on their security strategy is under
discussion
with the
US, with a view to early agreement with the ITG. MOD work to
deliver
Military
Transition Teams in MND(SE), as part of the move towards regional
control,
is well
advanced. The continuing delay in the establishment of the ITG is a
serious
concern,
and we are working closely with the US to push for speedy
resolution.
Plans for
early engagement with the ITG are already in place. The concept of
the
International
Conference is being fleshed out, with a focus on inclusivity and
donor
co-ordination.
We are looking at how we can achieve both short and
medium-term
improvements
in the power situation.”
281
Private
hearing, 15 June 2010, page 8.
282
Letter from
Quarrey to Siddiq, 14 March 2005, Iraq: Allawi’.
283
He did not,
in the end, join the ITG, but took his seat in the National
Assembly, where he formed a new
alliance of
political parties under the Iraqi National List, which
contested the December 2005 elections to
the Council
of Representatives (see Section 9.4).
284
UN Security
Council, Press Release 11 April 2005 (SC/8355).
285
Telegram
147 Baghdad to FCO London, 17 March 2005, ‘Iraq: Formation of the
New Government:
Slow Progress’.
286
Manuscript
comment Blair on minute Quarrey to Prime Minister, 18 March 2005,
‘Iraq Update’.
287
Held on 10
March 2005, 17 March 2005 and 24 March 2005.
288
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 24 March 2005, ‘Iraq: Ad Hoc Ministerial
Meetings’.
477