4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
289.
In the main
text, but not in the Key Judgements, the Assessment warned
that
the
intelligence on Iraq’s WMD and ballistic missile programmes was
“sporadic
and
patchy”. It
added, however, that Iraq was:
“… well
practised in the art of deception, such as concealment and
exaggeration.
A complete
picture of the various programmes is therefore difficult. But it is
clear
that Iraq
continues to pursue a policy of acquiring WMD and their delivery
means.
Intelligence
indicates that planning to reconstitute some of its programmes
began
in 1995.
WMD programmes were then given a further boost with the withdrawal
of
UNSCOM
inspectors.”
290.
The detailed
assessment of Iraq’s capabilities is set out in the Box
below.
Ballistic
missiles
•
“Iraq has
rebuilt much of the military production infrastructures associated
with the
missile
programme and the few high profile sites targeted in Operation
Desert Fox
in
1998.”
•
“New
infrastructure is being built with a particular focus on improving
the support
to the
solid propellant missile programme.”
•
The
Al
Samoud missile had
been “extensively flight-tested” and intelligence
indicated
that Iraq had “produced at least 50 … including those test
fired”.
Preparations
were under way “to deploy some of these to military
units”.
•
“Iraq has
reportedly succeeded in developing a number of 200km variants
of
Al Samoud
although it is unclear if these are for operational use or research
and
development
for longer range systems.”
•
“A small
number of transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) have been
seen,
although
others may exist.”
•
Both the Al
Samoud and the Al Hussein “could deliver basic chemical
and
biological
warheads”. There were “a limited number of launchers available”
for
the
missiles. “Identification and destruction by US aircraft of these
missiles” was
“unlikely
in the first few days of an attack”.
•
The
“solid-propellant Ababil-100
has also been
tested and has reached ranges up
to 150 km.
We judge that this system is likely to become operational as an
SRBM
[short-range
ballistic missile] within 2 years. It might enter service earlier
as an
artillery
rocket. Intelligence indicates that Iraq has plans to extend the
range …
to 250km.”
•
Iraq was
“seeking to develop new, larger liquid
and solid propellant missiles,
contrary to
UN limits”.
•
“Recent
intelligence” indicated “personnel associated with the Al
Samoud
programme”
had “now been tasked to concentrate on designing liquid
propellant
systems
with ranges of 2,000-3,000km”.
65