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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
or as little as we can get away with (ie less)?’ The question is not posed in that
form and hence is not answered. The choice is essentially political, but it is
essential to note that the cost of a deployment on this medium scale is about
£1bn a year.”
373.  Mr Dodds also reported that the MOD understood that the US now intended to
create four, two‑star (Divisional) commands in Iraq; the MOD’s “ambition” was to secure
one of those commands. However:
“… we should not be too ready to take on a ‘two‑star command’ without the
necessary guarantees. The military will baulk at this – a ‘2‑Star command’ would
provide a seat at the top table in the aftermath. But the risks that it brings of costs
that we cannot afford both militarily and financially mean that it comes at potentially
a high price.”
374.  Mr Dodds advised that, given that this was an issue on which the Treasury and the
MOD differed, Mr Brown’s input “could be invaluable”.
375.  Mr Dodds also advised that Mr Brown might have a view on “whether to press for
a smaller commitment than the £1bn ‘medium’ scale deployment that MOD/FCO have
offered”.
376.  Mr Dodds concluded by stating that it would be useful if Mr Brown could “urge
caution at Cabinet in taking on post‑conflict commitments without assurances from the
US on a further UN resolution and about military support to any UK‑led post‑conflict
command”.
377.  Section 8 describes how the UK took responsibility for a sector of Iraq, which
would become Multi‑National Division (South‑East) (MND(SE)).
378.  At the 27 March meeting of Cabinet, Mr Brown reported that he was making
available an additional £120m for humanitarian relief and raising the allocation of funds
for the conflict from £1.75bn to £3bn.219
379.  In his 9 April Budget statement to the House of Commons, Mr Brown announced
that he had set aside £3bn in a “Special Reserve” available to the MOD, so that UK
troops could be properly equipped and resourced.220
380.  Mr Brown told the Inquiry that represented £1bn a year for three years.221
381.  £1bn was the cost of a medium‑scale military commitment in the post‑conflict
period, as estimated by Mr Dodds in his 24 March minute to Mr Brown.
219 Cabinet Conclusions, 27 March 2003.
220 House of Commons, Official Report, 9 April 2003, columns 271‑88.
221 Public hearing, 5 March 2010, page 90.
504
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