The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
incoherently
without any real reference to the UN or political
timetable”.492
Mr Hoon
might
ask Adm
Boyce a number of questions, including:
•
When a
decision on Turkey was needed?
•
Whether it
was “still worth pursuing Turkey given the difficulty the US”
was
having?
•
Whether
there was “a worthwhile role for any heavy forces” if Turkey was
not
available.
•
“When do we
bite the bullet and rule out the heavy land option? Or are
we
content to
march them up to the top of the hill just for force on mind? How
would
we cope
with the morale implications?”
1307.
Mr Hoon
would “need to see properly considered and realistically
argued
submissions”
if early decisions were needed.
1308.
The record of
the conversation with Adm Boyce stated that, in relation to
the
work on
land options, Mr Hoon was reluctant to take any risks with Op
FRESCO’s
1309.
Mr Hoon
was content, for planning purposes, with the assumption that an
initial
tranche of
Reservists would be called out on or about 9 January. That would
“be subject
to
clearance from No.10 in due course”. He also wanted to avoid any
clearly visible
increase in
activity “over and above what he [had] foreshadowed in his
Statement in
the House
[of Commons] on 18 December before 6 January”, because of the “need
to
balance the
diplomatic and military tracks”.
1310.
Mr Hoon
noted that further advice on preparations would be provided and
that it
would be
helpful to have a clearer sense of the US planning
timetable.
Adm Boyce
issued a Planning and Preparation Directive on 30
December.494
That
gave
Lt Gen Reith:
“authority to undertake the necessary preparations, including
reductions in
Notice to
Move and overt training, in order that UK forces identified for
potential operations
in Iraq are
in all aspects ready for Coalition military operations”, including
ensuring 16 Air
Assault
Brigade was ready for operations.
The
Directive stated: “The codeword for the preparatory phase of this
operation, and if UK
forces are
subsequently required to commit to action in the execution phase,
is TELIC.”
On Phase
IV, it stated:
“Delivering
HMG’s [Her Majesty’s Government’s] declared end state is likely
to
require UK
engagement in follow‑on operations but the possible scale and
duration
492
Minute
Williams to SofS [MOD], 20 December 2002, ‘Military Planning for
Iraq’.
493
Minute
Watkins to Hd Sec (Iraq), 23 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Early
Decisions’.
494
Paper CDS,
30 December 2002, ‘CDS Planning and Preparation Directive for
Operation TELIC’.
368