The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
194.
Reflecting on
the prospects for provincial transfer and stability, the JIC
assessed
that:
“Competition
for economic and political control among Iraqi political factions,
in most
cases
backed by militias, is likely to intensify. The political dynamics
in the south
reflect
tensions among the Shia parties in central government … Parties are
vying
for control
and creating a patchwork of influence in local government
structures,
many of
which are resistant to instruction from Baghdad. Militias and
locally raised
ISF are
increasingly competing to be seen as the legitimate providers of
security
and are
being used as such by political groups. Major constitutional
issues, such as
federalism,
remain undecided and will form the backdrop to the anticipated
spring
2007
provincial elections, when we anticipate increased intra‑Shia
violence.”
195.
The JIC judged
that it would prove more challenging to achieve the same
level
of stability
in Maysan as had been achieved in Muthanna and Dhi
Qar:
“But we
judge it is the extent of stability and economic recovery in Basra
– the
second city
of Iraq – which will shape and define the nature of transition
across
the South.
Declining security is undermining the prospects for Basra next
year.
We judge
that action to improve security, address corruption within the
police, tackle
the Shia
extremists, deliver civil reconstruction projects and kick‑start
longer‑term
economic
growth are essential if Basra is to match coalition expectations
for
successful
transition … It remains uncertain whether the Iraqi authorities
have the
necessary
will or capacity to maintain progress over the long
term.”
196.
On 28
September, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs
told him
that Prime
Minister Maliki was unwilling to sanction aggressive action against
Shia
militias in
Baghdad and that this was “of a piece with his opposition to the
original
Op SALAMANCA”.123
Op SINBAD
was now happening in less sensitive areas of Basra,
focusing on
“cleaning up the Basra police, and quick impact reconstruction work
in
cleared
areas of the city”.
197.
Maj Gen
Shirreff reported on 28 September that Op SINBAD had at last
begun,
after a
“tortuous” round of final negotiations with Iraqi
politicians.124
He observed
that
MND(SE)
“remain[s] on very thin ice politically” but the initial operations
had gone
exceptionally
well:
“What made
a particular impact was the very evident Iraqi face on the
operation,
both in the
form of Iraqi sappers working alongside British sappers and Iraqi
Army
security
patrols on the streets alongside MNF.”
198.
Despite the
good news, Maj Gen Shirreff also reported that there had been
an
increase in
the number of attacks – the figures for Explosively Formed
Projectile (EFP)
123
Minute
Phillipson to Prime Minister, 28 September 2006, ‘Secure call with
President Bush, 1215
29
September 2006’.
124
Minute
Shirreff, 28 September 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update –
28 September 2006’.
40