The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

JIC Assessment, 19 April 2002

17.  The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) judged on 19 April that it would be

politically impossible for Arab states to support military action against Iraq.

18.  Regional states would prefer UN inspections or covert operations to topple

Saddam Hussein to a US-led attack, but US determination and a willingness to

deploy overwhelming force could help bolster regional support.

19.  There was consensus amongst Iraq’s neighbours that its territorial integrity

must be preserved.

20.  At the request of the JIC, an Assessment of “Iraq’s relations with its neighbours …

what influence Iraq has over them and how it is trying to improve its position; where

Iraq’s neighbours’ concerns and interests lie” and an evaluation of “the regional reactions

so far to the prospects of a US-led attack on Iraq” was produced on 19 April.6

21.  During the discussion of the draft, the JIC had been told that Israel’s attack on Jenin

in the Occupied Territories had produced a “seismic shift” and there were “few, if any,

Arab countries who would support a strike against Iraq”.7

22.  The JIC asked for the position of Iran and Saudi Arabia to be brought out more

clearly in the final Assessment.

23.  The JIC’s Key Judgements were:

• “The current Israel/ Palestinian crisis makes Arab support for an attack on

Iraq politically impossible at present. There is no sign that strong anti-US

sentiment will dissipate quickly, even if there is progress towards an equitable

resolution of the Palestinian issue.”

• “Iraq exerts considerable economic leverage over Jordan and Syria. Iraqi

propaganda successfully plays up Iraq’s suffering under sanctions. And Iraq

uses its support for the Palestinians to gain popularity in the Arab street.”

• “But Iraq has no real allies. Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia remain concerned

by Iraq’s conventional military capabilities. Iran is also concerned by its

development of WMD.”

• “Turkey would probably be willing to provide basing for a US-led attack on

Iraq … Saudi Arabia is very unlikely to provide basing for an attack, though it

might permit overflights. A strong case for action would need to be made. US

determination and willingness to deploy overwhelming force could help bolster

regional support. However, all would strongly prefer covert operations to topple

Saddam rather than a full-scale attack.”

6  JIC Assessment, 19 April 2002, ‘Iraq: Regional Attitudes’.

7  Minutes, 17 April 2002, JIC meeting.

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