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9.4  |  June 2005 to May 2006
Table 1: December 2005 election results
Party
United Iraqi Alliance
Kurdish Alliance
Iraqi Tawafuq (Consensus) Front
National Iraqiya List
Iraqi Front for National Dialogue (Hiwar)
Kurdish Islamic Union
Al-Risaliyun (Progressives)
Liberation & Reconciliation Gathering
Iraqi Turkmen Front
Al-Rafidain (Assyrian Christians)
Mithal Al-Alousi
Yezidi Movement
Other parties/invalid votes
TOTAL
% votes
41.2%
21.7%
15.1%
8.0%
4.1%
1.3%
1.2%
1.1%
0.7%
0.4%
0.3%
0.2%
4.8%
Seats won
128
53
44
25
11
5
2
3
1
1
1
1
0
275
525.  Visiting Washington on 20 January, Sir Nigel Sheinwald told all of his interlocutors
(from the National Security Council, State Department and Department of Defense) that
Mr Blair placed importance on “seizing the opportunity presented by the elections”.249
526.  That meant moving quickly to form a genuine unity government, with capacity
to make and implement decisions. Sunni outreach should continue, and the new
government should make “an early, comprehensive statement of their programme”.
That would set the context for a “conditions-based drawdown of forces in MND(SE)”.
527.  Diplomatic reporting from Baghdad in early 2006 was heavily focused on the
formation of a new government. As the reports contained accounts of private discussions
with individual politicians, many of whom remain active in Iraqi politics, the Inquiry will
not give a detailed description of them.
528.  Mr Asquith told the Inquiry that after the election “there was a series of visits from
the Foreign Secretary, and from senior officials to Iraq, to Baghdad, to try and persuade
the politicians, the Iraqi politicians, to come to agreement”.250
249  Letter Phillipson to Hayes, 21 January 2006, ‘Nigel Sheinwald’s talks in Washington, 20 January:
Middle East issues and Afghanistan’.
250  Private hearing, 15 June 2010, page 21.
577
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