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1.2  |  Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September 2001
311.  Mr Blair spoke to President Vladimir Putin on 27 June, but without reaching
agreement on the UK proposals.167
312.  Mr Blair spoke separately to Presidents Chirac and Bush on 29 June. The record
confirms Sir Jeremy’s account of the French position.168
313.  The UN Security Council adopted resolution 1360 on 3 July 2001, extending the
OFF programme by five months.
314.  An FCO briefing for Mr Straw stated that the UK would use the time to work on the
Russians, who were seen as isolated.169
315.  In his statement in the Security Council of the UK position after the vote on
resolution 1360, Sir Jeremy Greenstock said that there was:
“… now a wide sense across the United Nations that it is the right time for new
arrangements, such as those we have proposed … There is no good reason
for delay.
“… We remain ready to engage in discussion of the implementation of
resolution 1284 … But there is as yet no sign of a willingness by Iraq even to begin
to co-operate in meeting its obligations under that resolution or, indeed, under other
resolutions. Iraq consistently refuses to contemplate the return of United Nations
disarmament inspectors. Why, then, delay the adoption of improvements in the
humanitarian programme?”170
316.  The US representative stated that a GRL, which was central to the new approach,
had been produced the previous week. It would have been adopted that day “save for
the threat of a veto. But a veto would bring our work to a halt and thus would be a victory
for Iraq.”
317.  Syria stated that there was a need to take “a comprehensive approach … leading
to a resolution of the humanitarian issues facing Iraq and neighbouring countries”.
318.  Mr Straw visited Washington from 10 to 11 July.
319.  Briefings for the visit from the British Embassy Washington and the FCO
reflected concerns that, following the failed attempts to secure a new resolution, the
US Administration could shift its policy away from diplomatic containment and towards
regime overthrow.171
167  Letter Sawers to McDonald, 27 June 2001, ‘Telephone Conversation with Russian President: Iraq’.
168  Letter Sawers to McDonald, 29 June 2001, ‘Prime Minister’s Telephone Calls to President Chirac and
President Bush Iraq’.
169  Briefing FCO, [undated], ‘Secretary of State’s visit to the United States: 10-11 July 2001 Iraq’.
170  UN Security Council, ‘4344th Meeting Tuesday 3 July 2001’ (S/PV.4344).
171  Telegram 765 Washington to FCO London, 5 July 2001, ‘Your Visit to Washington: Foreign Policy
Issues’; Briefing FCO, [undated], ‘Secretary of State’s Visit to the United States: 10-11 July 2001 Iraq’.
251
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