4.4  |  The search for WMD

23.  Mr Crouch also agreed with Mr Hoon that UNMOVIC and the IAEA should help

verify WMD discoveries in order to counter speculation that they had been planted.

24.  On 17 February, the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) informed Mr Hoon of

the deployment the next day of 74 personnel to participate in SSE “mission rehearsal

training” in Kuwait, and that up to 92 more personnel assigned to military operations in

Iraq might be “co-opted” to participate in SSE operations as necessary.7

25.  PJHQ stated that the priority was to ensure that any UK contribution:

• was coherent with wider policy objectives;

• did not put at risk the response to any chemical, biological, radiological and

nuclear (CBRN) incident in the UK;

• was “efficient and effective”: no more than needed to achieve the UK’s aim and

support the US; and

• took account of the significant Home Base and Force Protection demands on

the UK’s EOD and CBRN resources.

26.  Mr Hoon approved the deployment of 74 UK personnel.8 With planning “still at

an early stage”, he asked for further advice on SSE operations after the rehearsal,

including on:

• operational management of specialists in the SSE teams, including those from

other agencies;

• “impartiality mechanisms”, including the early involvement of UNMOVIC and the

IAEA; and

• evidence handling procedures.

PJHQ was also asked to reiterate to the US the UK’s concerns about impartiality.

27.  Mr Hoon requested that further Ministerial approval be sought for the participation of

additional personnel.

7  Minute Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 17 January [sic] 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Contribution to

Sensitive Site Exploitation’.

8  Minute Williams to PJHQ-Dep Hd Pol/Ops(ME), 18 February 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Contribution to Sensitive

Site Exploitation’.

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