The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
of
government and the state.545
Dr Allawi
made clear that tackling the security situation
was his top
priority, but he lacked effective resources to achieve that. He
“needed:
the two
mechanised divisions, a Rapid Deployment Force,546
an
effective anti‑terrorist
capability
in the police, and a more rapid build up of intelligence
capability”. Mr Blair
commissioned
advice from Lt Gen McColl on how best to meet that
requirement.
605.
On 20
September, Mr Naworynsky provided two papers to No.10:
“one
on the
current status of the ISF, including an analysis of the Petraeus
Plan and
recommendations
for further work”; and a speaking note for Mr Blair’s next
conversation
606.
The first
paper listed the current capability of the ISF as 91,000 recruited
and
trained
personnel, comprising:
•
34,500
police;
•
34,200
members of the National Guard;
•
14,300
border officers;
•
4,800
regular army;
•
1,900 Army
Intervention Force; and
•
600 Special
Forces.
607.
Those forces
were “totally reliant on the Multi‑National Force (MNF) for
support”
and
“turning quantity into quality – the key to our withdrawal” would
“take time”.
608.
The Petraeus
Plan had forecast that by the end of 2005, total ISF strength
would
be 234,000
and it would be “able to tackle the majority of threats currently
present
in Iraq”.
The paper noted that that was ambitious but would in time deliver
security
forces to
meet Iraq’s predicted needs. It could be accelerated to deliver
more forces
with
counter‑insurgency capability sooner, but only by taking resources
from long‑term
development,
and so ultimately extending the length of the programme and the
presence
of UK
forces in Iraq. The paper stated: “This would not be
desirable.”
609.
The paper
stated that the UK could complement the Petraeus Plan by:
continuing
to support
the MOI and IMOD; procuring equipment for the ISF in MND(SE);
continuing
training
and mentoring the ISF; supporting NATO training of the middle and
senior ranks
and
“consider whether the ISF require a heavy force”.
610.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald annotated the covering letter: “This is v.
feeble”.548
545
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 19 September 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Meeting with Prime Minister
Allawi,
Sunday 19 September’.
546 A
Rapid Deployment Force is a military formation typically consisting
of elite military units and usually
trained at
a higher intensity than the rest of their country’s
military.
547
Letter
Naworynsky to Quarrey, 20 September 2004, ‘Advice for the Prime
Minister’s Next VTC with
President
Bush’.
548
Manuscript
comment Sheinwald on Letter Naworynsky to Quarrey, 20 September
2004, ‘Advice for the
Prime
Minister’s Next VTC with President Bush’.
188