1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
diplomacy
firmly backed by the willingness to use force if diplomacy should
fail”, and
no one
could “seriously imagine” the same result without
that.
473.
Sir John said
that there were two important messages in the
resolution:
•
Iraq was
obliged to provide access at all sites, “not just in the eight
so-called
Presidential
sites which have up to now been the pretext for so much delay
and
obstruction”.
•
The Iraqi
regime had a choice. If it fulfilled its commitments, the way
would
“be open
for the lifting of sanctions”; but if it failed to comply, that
would “not
be
tolerated”. The Council was “determined that any violation will
result in the
severest
consequences”.
474.
Sir John
concluded that, if Iraq doubted the will of the international
community,
it
would:
“… not for
the first time, be making a grave mistake.
“There is a
great need at such moments to face up with courage and
intellectual
honesty to
unpalatable truths. Regional security, the future of
non-proliferation
under international
auspices, and the authority of the United Nations and
its
Secretary-General
are all involved, and are all at stake, in our collective
efforts
to get the
case of Iraq right.”
475.
Welcoming
Mr Annan’s success and the text of the draft resolution,
Mr Fernando
Berrocal
Soto, Costa Rican Permanent Representative to the UN, emphasised
the “key
concept of
international legality and the primacy of the provisions of the
Charter over
any
political considerations”. Bringing the MOU agreed on
23 February into the legal
framework
authorised by Chapter VII left “no political or legal doubt
whatsoever about
the
seriousness and gravity of this warning by the Security Council”.
The “prerogatives
and legal
competences” were “exclusively of the Security Council” and could
not be
delegated.
476.
Mr Celso
Amorim, Brazilian Permanent Representative to the UN,
referred
to the
strain the crisis had placed on a multilateral system “still
learning to cope
with the
challenges of the post-cold-war era” and the Security Council’s
wisdom in
encouraging
the Secretary-General to “undertake a personal mission”.
Mr Annan had
“succeeded
in a mission that sceptics had considered doomed from the
start”; and his
“determination … to
keep this matter under his close personal supervision …
provides
the Security
Council with a fair chance to put the problem of the relations
between Iraq
and the
United Nations on a more stable foundation”.
477.
Mr Amorim
also pointed out that, in resolution 687, the Security Council
had
decided “to
take such further steps as may be required for the implementation
of the
present
resolution”, rather than the “ritual formula” of deciding to
“remain seized of the
matter”. As
a result, he concluded that:
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