3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
233.
The FCO was
concerned that Mr Blair should strike a balance
between
acknowledging
the deficiencies of the policy of containment without
saying
it had
failed.
234.
In preparation
for his press conference in Sedgefield, Mr Blair asked
for:
•
a summary
of “what we knew of the existing Iraqi WMD programme, in
particular
ballistic
missile technology (and its significance); and nuclear
weapons
technology
(including why the civil nuclear programmes they are funding
is
almost
certainly misused for weapons programmes)”;
•
a “list of
Saddam Hussein’s atrocities”;
•
a “rough
summary” of statistics showing the brutality of political
repression;
•
information
on the “sanctions programme and containment” telling him “why
the
policy of
containment cannot continue indefinitely”; and
•
information
on the extent to which Saddam Hussein’s refusal to use
the
Oil‑for‑Food
programme properly was harming the Iraqi people.80
235.
Advice was
provided by Mr Straw’s Private Office on 2
September.81
236.
Mr Charles
Gray, Head of the FCO Middle East Department, explained
to
Mr Peter Ricketts,
FCO Political Director:
“The
difficulty lies in providing No.10 with language which will
adequately bring out
the
deficiencies in our present policy and show that there is a need to
move beyond
it, without
suggesting that it has been a total failure (which, for the reasons
set out in
the first
version … we do not believe to be the case). And I also see a
presentational
risk that
if we do not in the end go hard over on a policy of military
action, and [we]
have
already said categorically that containment has failed, we shall be
setting
ourselves
up for accusations that we are then left with no policy at
all.
“So rather
than tie us down to pursuing an alternative to containment
immediately,
the
language … seeks to demonstrate why the present state of affairs
cannot
continue
indefinitely, thus leaving us with some flexibility on the timing
of any
237.
As well as the
briefing note, Mr Rycroft was sent a “blind copy” of
Mr Gray’s
minute. He
advised Mr Blair: “We need to bring out the deficiencies of
the containment
policy
without saying that it has been a total failure.”83
80
Minute
Blair to Manning, 1 September 2002, [untitled].
81
Letter
Sedwill to Rycroft, 2 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.
82
Manuscript
comment Sedwill to Rycroft on Minute Gray to Ricketts, 3 September
2002,
‘Iraq: Containment:
Query from No. 10’.
83
Manuscript
comment Rycroft to Prime Minister, 3 September 2002, on FCO
briefing note ‘4. The
sanctions
programme and containment’.
135