The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Mosul fell
to allied control, or if Iraqi military units rebelled”. He “would
wait and see how
neighbouring
countries reacted to any Allied attack, and whether they had
allowed their
territory
to be used by Allied forces, before deciding whether to use CBW
against them”.
His initial
“targets” would be “Israel, Kuwait and Jordan”.
91.
In the JIC
discussion on 4 December, the draft Assessment was described as
“an
important
paper which highlighted the gaps in our knowledge”.31
The
judgements were
based
“largely on a mixture of observation and past experience”, but the
Assessment
“did not
quite do justice to the intelligence”; the judgements “could be
made more
confidently”.
The Assessment needed to bring out more clearly the risks of a
phased
attack and
unpack the risks involved in possible scenarios, such as the
possible use
of CBW
before Coalition Forces were properly assembled and urban
fighting.
92.
The JIC issued
an Assessment of Iraq’s military capabilities and options,
which
is considered
in more detail in Section 6.1, on 6 December 2002.32
93.
A Key
Judgement stated that:
“Saddam
would use chemical and biological weapons … if he faced
defeat.
He might
also use them earlier in a conflict, including against Coalition
Forces,
neighbouring
states and his own people. Israel could be his first target
…”
94.
In the main
text, the JIC set out its assessment of Iraq’s missiles and
unguided
rockets.
The text of the Assessment stated that, given the limited number of
Al Hussein
missiles,
Iraq would use them “principally against Israel”. Shorter-range
missiles and
unguided
rockets “might be used against deployed coalition forces or Iraq’s
neighbours”.
95.
The Assessment
stated:
“We judge
Iraq would be able to arm at least some of the missiles and
rockets
with
chemical and biological (CBW) warheads. Iraqi aircraft or artillery
could also
deliver
CBW. […] in mid-September Saddam re-iterated his willingness to
use
CBW, […].
Saddam also envisaged using CBW against Israel, Kuwait, and
Jordan.
This is
consistent with earlier intelligence, but we lack definite
corroboration. […]
Iraqi
interest in procuring large quantities of protective equipment and
treatments for
exposure to
nerve agent. […] the regime would consider using CBW against
internal
uprisings
or Shia-populated Iraqi cities, and for propaganda purposes could
seek
to blame
the coalition. CBW use against civilians could cause severe
casualties.
And even
relatively small-scale use could cause widespread panic and a
serious
humanitarian
impact. Iraq’s ability to use CBW might be constrained by its
available
stocks of
agent and the difficulty of producing more while inspectors are
present.
But we do
not know the extent of Iraq’s current stocks or what it might have
at
such a stage.”
31
Minutes, 4
December 2002, JIC meeting.
32
JIC
Assessment, 6 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Options’.
308