4.4 | The
search for WMD
discussed
the need for more individuals working on nuclear matters.
Addressing the very
large
quantity of documents held was being given a lower
priority.
433.
During
August, UK and US officials began to discuss the content of Dr
Kay’s
ISG Interim
Report, scheduled for the second half of September.
434.
UK
officials assessed that the report “certainly would not”
persuade
sceptics,
but might be enough to persuade others that progress was being
made.
435.
At the end
of August, the British Embassy Washington reported that
the
US Government
was bracing itself for a disappointing report.
436.
Mr Scarlett
succeeded Sir Richard Dearlove as Chief of SIS on
1 August.
437.
Dr Kay and Maj
Gen Dayton visited London on 5 August.230
438.
On
6 August, Mr Howard sent Mr Scarlett thoughts on
handling Dr Kay’s first
progress
report, scheduled for mid to late September. It was essential that
any public
report was
“firmly based on an honest and thorough assessment of the
intelligence
picture so
far” and that the UK’s classified assessment “matches that of the
Americans
exactly”.
Mr Howard suggested that public perceptions were “heavily
skewed” by media
interest in
Dr Kelly and the Hutton Inquiry, and that there was likely to
remain “a deep
vein of
scepticism” about what might be found.
“… a
progress report which focuses mainly on evidence of programmes and
intent
and is
short on actual hardware is likely to provoke a mixed reaction. It
certainly will
not
persuade the sceptics. But it may be enough to persuade the
mainstream that
progress is
being made.”
440.
Mr Scarlett
updated No.10 on 8 August.231
He reported
that Dr Kay was convinced
that the
ISG was making progress, but cautioned that Dr Kay had a “tendency
to
overstate
potential leads”. ISG efforts were focused on BW, but there was
also progress
in other
areas. Developments included:
•
BW: the ISG
was developing a clearer picture of the role of the Iraqi
Intelligence
Service
(IIS). It had concluded that the UN would not have been able to
discover
the full
extent of Iraq’s BW programme because of “the comprehensive
nature
of Iraq’s
concealment and deception policy”. The 97 vials recovered from
the
home of a
BW scientist had tested positive for traces of live type B
clostridium
botulinum,
the cause of botulism in humans. Iraq had never declared
possession
of the type
B strain.
230
Letter
Howard to Scarlett, 6 August 2003, ‘Iraqi WMD: Next
Steps’.
231
Minute
Scarlett to Cannon, 8 August 2003, ‘Iraq WMD’.
511