4.2 | Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

436. In the context of Sir Richard Dearlove’s evidence, that he had told Mr Blair on

12 September 2002 that the SIS report issued on 11 September was developmental and

the source unproven, the Butler Report stated:

“Nevertheless, it may be that, in the context of the intense interest at that moment

in the status of Iraq’s prohibited weapons programmes, and in particular continuing

work on the dossier, the concurrence of events caused more weight to be given to

this unvalidated new source than would normally have been the case.”213

437. In his evidence to the Inquiry, Sir Richard Dearlove maintained that material from

the report of 11 September had not been used in the dossier:

“… maybe I should add now, because I’m sure you are going to question me …

I think this is an important point, so we don’t waste too much time on it. I can say

very authoritatively there was no material in the dossier [from the new source on trial

in September 2002].

“I can also say, if you actually look at the introduction to the dossier, it refers to

assessed intelligence, specifically assessed intelligence. [The new source on trial]

was not assessed intelligence, and therefore are actually authoritatively excluded

because they don’t fall into that category, and I had put my foot down and said this

material could not be used.”214

438. Sir Richard subsequently told the Inquiry that he had insisted that the September

reporting was not included in the dossier because he wanted to retain the source for use

during inspections.215

439. Sir John Scarlett told the Inquiry that the “further intelligence” reporting on the

“acceleration” of the “production of chemical and biological agent” was “regarded as

significant”.216

440. Sir John subsequently stated that the report issued on 11 September was

“influential” and “did famously influence what was said in the dossier”.217 He also referred

to a further report from the same source in late September and that “a composite

version” of the two reports had been “issued in early April 2003” and that it “was still

considered to be sound reporting as of that date”.

441. The SIS report of 23 September is addressed in the Box below.

213 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,

paragraph 578.

214 Private hearing, 16 June 2010, page 56.

215 Private hearing, 13 July 2010, pages 30-31.

216 Public hearing, 8 December 2009, page 41.

217 Private hearing, 5 May 2010, page 20.

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