9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
was “in our
interests” to hold JAM1 until the end of the current phase of the
operation.
In
particular, the official wondered, “how will it look
presentationally if we keep him
past PIC?”
572.
Mr Day
wrote to Lt Gen Wall on 5 November with an account of
discussions
between Maj
Gen Binns and Mr Browne on JAM1 during Mr Browne’s visit
to Basra.268
Mr Day
suggested that the key points were:
“•
the extent
to which a long term deal is embedded in – and, indeed,
fundamental
to –
thinking in theatre on political engagement and shifting the gunmen
into
politics;
•
[officials’]
caution about the prospects for success;
•
the
fragility of our hold on [JAM1] after his release – the levers
listed in previous
draft
papers are in my view inadequate to constrain him once out of our
hands.”
573.
Mr Day
considered that it was important to recognise that:
“…
negotiating a long term relationship with [JAM1] is tantamount to
taking a punt at
long odds.
But the alternatives may well be even less attractive. Having
discussed
the pros
and cons with SofS and Graham Binns, I think the key questions on
which
we need to
provide advice are:
•
What are
the legal implications/commitment of the kind of political
and
economic
‘deals’ we are considering – in particular on providing
intelligence
to [JAM1]
and transferring internees from US custody?
•
How do we
engage the key Iraqi players (presumably Maliki, Mohan
and
Jalil) and
do they have a say or a veto?”
“This is
essentially a political judgement call so we need to expose all of
the factors
for SofS.
In the shorter term, I have confirmed with SofS’s office that they
have no
record of
SofS agreeing that theatre can release further internees without
consulting
MOD. That
was certainly my understanding, at least as until we have a long
term
policy in
place.”
575.
Mr Lyall
Grant chaired a meeting on 6 November to consider the negotiations
with
JAM1.269
It was
attended by representatives from the MOD, the FCO, DFID, the
Cabinet
Office, SIS
and GCHQ.
576.
The Inquiry
has seen accounts of that meeting written by attendees from
the
MOD and
other organisations, but the Government has confirmed that no
formal minutes
of the
meeting exist.
268
Minute Day
to DCDS(C), 5 November 2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]’.
269
Email
junior official specialising in the Middle East, 8 November 2007,
‘[NAME OF OPERATION]:
FCO Lead
on Strategic Development of the Initiative’.
289