4.4 | The
search for WMD
“The Report
provides chapter and verse as to why the policy of containment was
not
868.
At PMQs on
13 October, Mr Blair stated:
“We know
from the Iraq Survey Group that he [Saddam Hussein] indeed had
the
intent and
capability and retained the scientists and desire, but that he
might not
have had
stockpiles of actually deployable weapons. We have accepted
that
and I
have already apologised for any information that subsequently
turned
out to be
wrong.
…
“Those
people who want to pray in aid the Iraq Survey Group in respect of
stockpiles
of weapons
must also accept the other part of what the Iraq Survey
Group
said, which
is that Saddam retained the intent and the capability – the teams
of
scientists
and so on – and was in breach of United Nations resolutions. That
is what
Mr Duelfer
expressly said. It was the breach of UN resolutions and their
enforcement
that was
and is the reason for going to war.”485
869.
On
28 October, in response to a Written Parliamentary Question
from
Mr Llew
Smith (Labour) asking for a list of the conclusions of the ISG
Comprehensive
Report with
which the Foreign Secretary did not agree, Mr Denis
MacShane,
Foreign
Office Minister, set out three principal areas of
disagreement:
“The Iraq
Survey Group (ISG) Report concludes that there is no evidence to
suggest
that Iraq
sought to procure uranium from Africa in the 1990s. The
Government
continues
to believe that credible evidence exists to support the assertion
made in
the
September 2002 dossier. Lord Butler of Brockwell’s Review upheld
that belief.
The UK was
not in a position to share all the intelligence on this issue with
the ISG.
“The ISG
also expressed doubt that the aluminium tubes referred to in
the
September
dossier were evidence of a resumption of Iraq’s nuclear
programmes.
Again, Lord
Butler’s Review assessed this, and concluded that the Joint
Intelligence
Committee
were right to include reference to the tubes in the dossier and
that
it properly
reflected doubts about the use of the tubes in the caution of
its
assessments.
The Government fully accepts the findings of Lord Butler’s
Review.
“The ISG
also report that they found no evidence to support the claim in the
dossier
that Iraq
‘is almost certainly seeking an indigenous ability to enrich
uranium’ based
on gas
centrifuge technology. They do, however, admit that elements of
useful and
relevant
technologies were being developed.”486
484
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
12 October 2004, columns 151-152.
485
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
13 October 2004, column 278.
486
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
28 October 2004, column 1386W.
599