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4.4  |  The search for WMD
“The Report provides chapter and verse as to why the policy of containment was not
working.”484
868.  At PMQs on 13 October, Mr Blair stated:
“We know from the Iraq Survey Group that he [Saddam Hussein] indeed had the
intent and capability and retained the scientists and desire, but that he might not
have had stockpiles of actually deployable weapons. We have accepted that
and I have already apologised for any information that subsequently turned
out to be wrong.
“Those people who want to pray in aid the Iraq Survey Group in respect of stockpiles
of weapons must also accept the other part of what the Iraq Survey Group
said, which is that Saddam retained the intent and the capability – the teams of
scientists and so on – and was in breach of United Nations resolutions. That is what
Mr Duelfer expressly said. It was the breach of UN resolutions and their enforcement
that was and is the reason for going to war.”485
869.  On 28 October, in response to a Written Parliamentary Question from
Mr Llew Smith (Labour) asking for a list of the conclusions of the ISG Comprehensive
Report with which the Foreign Secretary did not agree, Mr Denis MacShane,
Foreign Office Minister, set out three principal areas of disagreement:
“The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) Report concludes that there is no evidence to suggest
that Iraq sought to procure uranium from Africa in the 1990s. The Government
continues to believe that credible evidence exists to support the assertion made in
the September 2002 dossier. Lord Butler of Brockwell’s Review upheld that belief.
The UK was not in a position to share all the intelligence on this issue with the ISG.
“The ISG also expressed doubt that the aluminium tubes referred to in the
September dossier were evidence of a resumption of Iraq’s nuclear programmes.
Again, Lord Butler’s Review assessed this, and concluded that the Joint Intelligence
Committee were right to include reference to the tubes in the dossier and that
it properly reflected doubts about the use of the tubes in the caution of its
assessments. The Government fully accepts the findings of Lord Butler’s Review.
“The ISG also report that they found no evidence to support the claim in the dossier
that Iraq ‘is almost certainly seeking an indigenous ability to enrich uranium’ based
on gas centrifuge technology. They do, however, admit that elements of useful and
relevant technologies were being developed.”486
484  House of Commons, Official Report, 12 October 2004, columns 151-152.
485  House of Commons, Official Report, 13 October 2004, column 278.
486  House of Commons, Official Report, 28 October 2004, column 1386W.
599
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