3.4 | Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September 2002

135. The JIC also concluded that in a conflict Saddam Hussein would order

missile strikes and the use of CBW against coalition forces, supporting regional

states and Israel.

136. The JIC had little intelligence on Iraq’s CBW and little insight into how it

would fight. Its conclusions reflected the Committee’s own judgements.

137. At the request of the MOD, the JIC issued an Assessment on 21 August

considering “what diplomatic options Saddam has to deter, avert or limit the scope of

a US‑led attack”.46 It also considered his “military options for facing a US‑led attack”

and how his analysis about each course of action might “change as an attack becomes

increasingly imminent”.

138. During the JIC discussion of the draft Assessment, it was suggested that Saddam

was “likely to exploit options on weapons inspectors as a stalling tactic. An offer of

unconditional access for weapons inspectors would attract international approval, and

allow Saddam breathing space.”47

139. The JIC examined Iraq’s options for the short term, whether Saddam Hussein

might seize the initiative, how Iraq might respond to a US military build‑up, Saddam’s

options in “war” – including the use of missiles and WMD and “alternative scenarios and

at the death”.48

140. WMD options were considered “only briefly” as the JIC would assess those in early

September.

141. The JIC’s Key Judgements and the relevant supporting text are set out in the

Box below.

142. The basis for the Assessment, and that the Key Judgements conveyed a much

greater sense of certainty that Saddam Hussein had chemical and biological weapons

and would act than the detailed text of the Assessment itself supported, are addressed

in Section 4.2.

Saddam Hussein’s aim would be “to remain in power. He will use all options to

achieve this. He remains innovative and capable of surprising us.”

• Saddam’s choices would “depend on his perceptions of the likelihood, credibility

and imminence of … a US‑led attack”.

46 JIC Assessment, 21 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Saddam’s Diplomatic and Military Options’.

47 Minutes, 21 August 2002, JIC meeting.

48 JIC Assessment, 21 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Saddam’s Diplomatic and Military Options’.

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