9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
recommended
that Mr Straw’s Private Office write to No.10 to register
these points.313
Sir Peter
Ricketts, UK Permanent Representative to NATO, endorsed
Mr Oakden’s
“… there is
a large element of tactics in the MOD’s current approach … there
has
been a
strong body of opinion, including the CGS, that since there is no
attractive
prospect of
using the ARRC in Iraq, we should use it … in Afghanistan, both to
do
the real
job that needs doing on the ground there, and because that is the
way to
maintain UK
leadership in NATO.”315
561.
Mr Oakden
wrote that in order to make an effective deployment of the ARRC
“you
would also
need to deploy a 2,500 strong manoeuvre battalion316
for the
ARRC to have
strategic
effect”. He also noted that Sir Kevin Tebbit had:
“… insisted
that with the MOD facing a massive overrun, they could not
put
themselves
in the position with HMT of arguing for additional commitments:
they
should let
others impose this on them; and let these others, No.10 or
whomever,
will the
necessary resources.”
562.
In the second
report to the United Nations under the terms of resolution 1483,
on
21 November
2003, the UK and US gave a detailed update on Coalition
activities.317
563.
A telegram
from the UK Mission to the United Nations in New York
(UKMIS
New York)
to the FCO recorded that Ambassador Negroponte had welcomed
the
15 November
Agreement as a step that would ensure rapid Iraqi control of their
own
affairs,
that basic freedoms and rights were protected under the law; and an
elected
Constitutional
Convention.
564.
Ambassador
Negroponte stated that the Multi-National Force would be
needed
until Iraq
could take on its own security and, as with reconstruction, he
hoped more
international
partners would participate. He emphasised that the UN also
had
a vital
role and that its return would be welcome. The US stood ready to
assist with
security
support.
565.
Sir Emyr Jones
Parry reported CPA progress in restoring basic services,
including
water and
electricity; repairs to Baghdad International Airport and Umm Qasr
port; and
work on
mobile phone networks.
313
Email
Oakden to Ehrman and Adams, 20 November 2003, ‘ARRC and
Afghanistan’.
314
Email
Ricketts to Oakden, Ehrman and Adams, 21 November 2003, ‘ARRC and
Afghanistan’.
315
Email
Oakden to Ehrman and Adams, 20 November 2003, ‘ARRC and
Afghanistan’.
316
It is not
clear what force Mr Oakden is describing. It is larger than
other battlegroups deployed
to
Afghanistan or Iraq but too small for a brigade.
317
Telegram
1609 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 22 November 2003, ‘Iraq: US/UK
Update
to the
Council’.
299