The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Iraqi
population and the early collapse of Saddam Hussein’s
regime.30
Gen
Franks
did
not want to give Saddam Hussein the opportunity to muster an
effective defence,
especially
the use of WMD, or to create major environmental damage as he had
in the
1991 Gulf
Conflict.
40.
Major General
Graham Binns, who commanded 7 Armoured Brigade, told
the
Inquiry:
“General
Franks’ view was that he wouldn’t enter any urban areas until he
had to
and that he
was prepared to block and bypass and isolate until he got to
Baghdad.” 31
41.
UK concerns
about the Iraqi regime’s plans to defend Baghdad, and the
implications
of having
to fight through urban areas for control, are set out in Section
6.2.
42.
After
“wargaming” the invasion plan, Gen Franks concluded that several
phases
could be
combined into a single simultaneous effort:
“…
five
days to position
the final airbridge after the President made a decision
to
launch the
operation, eleven
days to flow the
final pieces of the ‘start force’, sixteen
days
of combined
air and special operations attacks against key targets, and
a
total
of 125
days to complete
the destruction of Iraqi forces and the removal of
43.
In the event,
Gen Franks adjusted the timing further as a result of intelligence
which
suggested
that preparations were being made to destroy the Rumaylah
oilfields, so that
ground
forces would enter Iraq after just 24 hours of air
operations.
44.
The
military plan was approved on 14 March, including roles for 7
Armoured
Brigade and
16 Air Assault Brigade at an early stage of the
operation.
45.
When
Mr Blair agreed to the deployment of a large scale ground
force on
17 January
2003 (see Section 6.2), it was envisaged that:
•
3 Commando
Brigade and maritime and air forces would all have combat
roles
in the
initial stages of an invasion;
•
“approximately
10 days later”, the Divisional Headquarters and 16 Air
Assault
Brigade
would “relieve US forces in an area south of Basra and the
Euphrates,
including
the Rumaylah oilfields”; and
•
7 Armoured
Brigade “could protect the right flank of the US 1st
Marine
Expeditionary
Force as it advanced north”. That would “include securing
Basra
International
Airport and isolating (but not entering) Basra
itself”.33
30
Franks T
& McConnell M. American
Soldier,
HarperCollins, 2004.
31
Private
hearing, 2 June 2010, page 8.
32
Franks T
& McConnell M. American
Soldier,
HarperCollins, 2004.
33
Letter Hoon
to Blair, 16 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land
Contribution’.
12