14.1 | Military equipment (post-conflict)

575. On the same day, Lord Drayson asked Maj Gen Applegate:

“… for advice … in consultation with CJO and Land by 1600 14 July setting out

the number of vehicles required to meet present operational commitments … [and]

project plans for delivering the requisite number of vehicles in time to deploy on

the next Iraq roulement in November 2006.”299

576. On 11 July, Mr Browne told the House of Commons Defence Committee that the

increased IED threat had “generated a set of circumstances” where, in his view, the

MOD needed “to look at whether there is a need for something between Snatch Land

Rovers as a form of land transport and the Warrior”.300 In ordering a review of the use of

the Snatch, he had “accepted in principle” the need “to see if we can identify resources

that can be procured and deployed in the timescale that would provide that [the required]

level of protection while we wait for other armoured options becoming available”.

577. On 12 July, Brig Inshaw recommended that Maj Gen Applegate agree:

“Despite recent casualties, the requirement to operate PPVs on current operations

endures and may increase as Defence is likely to be required to conduct concurrent

… campaigns over the next 3‑4 years.”301

578. Brig Inshaw advised that there was a requirement for a “balanced PPV capability”.

It should include a medium weight PPV, for which there was “an urgent requirement”,

and light, agile PPVs “such as Vector”, although “commanders recognise that such

a vehicle will never be protected against the most demanding threats”.

579. Brig Inshaw advised that Brig Moore had examined “a number of options” that

were “either in development or in service elsewhere in the world”. Brig Inshaw wrote

that commanders accepted all of these could produce solutions that were “significantly

larger” or have “a more aggressive profile” than Snatch and Vector. It was accepted

that this was “a penalty” commanders would “have to pay for the improved levels of

protection”. Brig Inshaw added:

“To avoid confusion, it should be noted that PPVs will not deliver the capability or

overall protection levels we would expect of an in‑service APC [Armoured Personnel

Carrier] (such as FV430 Mk 3) or of FRES, which will be designed to operate in

a less permissive environment (where issues surrounding size and posture are far

less important) and to defeat a significantly more demanding threat. A mixed fleet of

light and medium PPVs would allow commanders to force package appropriately to

the terrain and task.”

299 Minute APS/Minister(DP) to CM(BM), 7 July 2006, ‘Protected Patrol Vehicles (PPV)’.

300 Defence Committee, Session 2005‑06, Defence – Minutes of Evidence, 11 July 2006, Q44.

301 Minute DCI(A) to MA/CM BM, 12 July 2006, ‘Requirement for a More Capable Protected Patrol

Vehicle (PPV)’.

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