The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

hostilities, as agreed by the RSG.257 JAM1 responded that it would take time to find

a real solution on handing in heavy weaponry and the protection of the MNF’s Iraqi

employees, who were widely considered to be British spies.

546.  JAM1 requested that a translation of the proposals be provided to his lawyer as

a representative of the OMS, the ultimate signatory of any agreement. In their report to

London, the officials concluded that “even genuinely determined attempts to engage

with the OMS … could take us up to mid-January and beyond. This would definitely

not wash.”

547.  ACM Stirrup visited Iraq between 26 and 29 October.258 Reporting the visit

to Mr Browne’s Private Secretary, ACM Stirrup’s Military Adviser recorded that

Maj Gen Binns remained confident of achieving PIC in Basra in December 2007,

although he was doubtful that the ISF had the ability to counter JAM if the cease-fire

broke.

548.  ACM Stirrup confirmed that the desired end state was “an enduring security which

facilitates a political climate suitable for development”. The ongoing JAM reconciliation

process and the continued strengthening of the Iraqi Army and the police were all

encouraging but: “the biggest lever for JAM to continue reconciliation was the fear of US

intervention in Basra, if conditions deteriorated”.

549.  Lt Gen Odierno told ACM Stirrup that he had initially been wary about the UK’s

proposed withdrawal from Basra Palace but that his fears had been unfounded. He was

“more than comfortable” with the prospect of PIC in Basra in December.

550.  Mr Brown and President Bush spoke by video conference on 29 October. In a short

discussion on Iraq, Mr Brown regretted that there had not been further Iraqi progress on

reconciliation.259 He explained that the UK was focused on consolidating the security and

economic situation in the south, and emphasised the importance of securing provincial

elections to promote a “solid democratic message”.

551.  Sir John Sawers, UK Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, wrote to

Sir Peter Ricketts, FCO Permanent Under Secretary, at the end of October to express

his concerns about the approach to the new resolution.260 Sir John understood that the

intention was that the new resolution would contain a formal commitment that it would

be the last and that the future presence of the MNF would be governed by one or more

257  Email official working closely with the military, 31 October 2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]: Meeting

with [JAM1] – 30 October’.

258  Minute Kyd to PS/SofS [MOD], 29 October 2007, ‘CDS Visit to Iraq 26-29 Oct 07’.

259  Letter Fletcher to Carver, 29 October 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with US President, 29 October’.

260  Letter Sawers to Ricketts, 29 October 2007, ‘Iraq: Renewal of MNF-I’s UN Mandate’.

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