The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
446.
The
decision‑makers in Iraq were the Heads of Post and Post Security
Officers
in Baghdad,
Basra and Kirkuk, advised by their Overseas Security Managers
(OSMs),
Post
Security Committees and the UK military.
447.
The IPU set
out the risk assessment procedures for posts in Iraq:
•
daily
assessment in each post of all operations in or out of compounds
and daily
contact
between the FCO and posts;
•
weekly
meetings of Post Security Committees, with records copied to the
FCO
with
recommendations as necessary;
•
every six
weeks “on average”, a London‑based “Nuts and Bolts” meeting
to
review
measures in place and agree next steps, involving relevant FCO
officials
and other
government departments as necessary;
•
quarterly
visits to posts by a UK‑based FCO OSA, who completed a
risk
assessment
matrix in line with FCO worldwide procedures;
•
immediate
reviews of security measures in response to incidents or
fresh
intelligence;
and
•
regular
reviews of contingency plans and business continuity
planning.
448.
The IPU
concluded that those procedures were “closely observed” and that
steps
taken by
the FCO to manage the risks to staff for whom it had a duty of care
“could be
used as
evidence of a reasonable standard of conduct by the FCO”. More work
was
needed
to:
•
improve
pre‑deployment procedures for staff from certain
departments;
•
clarify
with the MOD arrangements for the evacuation of third country
nationals
employed by
the FCO as contractors; and
•
clarify the
status of UK civilian police in Iraq: “It remains unclear whether
they
are our
employees or remain employees of their
constabularies.”
449.
In an annex to
the review, the IPU summarised departments’ and
organisations’
responsibilities
for the security of local and UK‑based staff and contractors. It
stated
that the
FCO’s duty of care “would extend to any visiting FCO staff and
staff seconded
temporarily
to the FCO or working directly under FCO supervision and
control”.
The FCO had
“a similar duty of care” to employees of other government
departments,
foreign
governments or international organisations “who live and/or work on
or visit
the
relevant mission compounds”. In practice, measures to protect those
personnel
had to be
the same as for FCO staff. “Inevitably”, pre‑deployment or
pre‑visit training
and medical
clearance might vary, but in the case of other government
departments it
was
“clearly desirable that close co‑ordination occurs and that the
same or equivalent
measures
are adopted”.
450.
The annex also
stated that the standard of care for contractors “may, in
particular
circumstances,
be lower than that required for employees”. Those
circumstances
included
where contractors had security expertise of their own and when it
“may not
322