9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
8.
On 27 June, at
the request of the MOD, the Joint Intelligence Committee
(JIC)
considered
the state of the Iraqi Security Forces (see Section 12.1 for more
detail on
Security
Sector Reform).3
9.
The JIC’s Key
Judgements included:
“I. Work is
under way in Prime Minister Maliki’s government to develop a
national
security
strategy, but it is unlikely to make a difference to Iraq’s
security as long
as the
government remains factionalised and fails to make progress on
national
reconciliation
…
“II. Policy
incoherence is exacerbated by a plethora of competing and
ineffectual
committees
operating with little central co-ordination …
“III. The
army continues to develop slowly … [Quality] varies markedly
between units
and there
are still serious systemic problems: leadership is weak;
under-manning
remains
common; logistic support is poor; many units lack key items of
equipment.
“IV. The
local Iraqi Police Service is at best ineffective. In many areas
the police are
synonymous
with militia or insurgents … Corruption is endemic. Many police
are
probably
unreformable.”
10.
The JIC also
considered that in the “likely event of serious intra-Shia fighting
the
police
would probably take sides … and the army would try to remain on the
sidelines”.
In Anbar,
locally-raised Sunni tribal units had been successful in reducing
violence, but
it was
“unrelenting” in Baghdad, Diyala and other mixed provinces around
the capital.
11.
The JIC
assessed that: “In the absence of a significant reduction in the
threat,
the Iraqi
security forces will be unable to cope” without combat support from
the
Multi‑National
Force (MNF) well beyond February 2008.
12.
On 29 June,
Mr Brown’s Private Secretary provided him with an update on
Iraq.4
Attached to
it was a note described as:
“… draft
new language, which you may want to use at PMQs [Prime
Minister’s
Questions]
… which aims to strike a realistic, more downbeat, tone on the
situation
in Iraq and
to put the onus for positive change firmly on the Iraqi
Government.”
13.
The update
characterised Iraqi politics as “tense and obstructed” and
complicated
by tensions
between the Sunni and other groups.
14.
In the South,
the note said, the situation remained “difficult” but the
appointment
of a new
police chief, Major General Jalil, and a new head of the Basra
Operations
Command,
General Mohan, was good news.
3
JIC
Assessment, 27 June 2007, ‘Iraqi Security Forces and Structures:
Quantity not Quality’.
4
Minute
Banner to Prime Minister, 29 June 2007, ‘Iraq –
Update’.
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