The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
provision
of a UK spokesman; and
•
UK
leadership of an ORHA group on “security sector management and
planning
for
security sector reform”.
Mr Straw
would write to Mr Blair on that point.
221.
On 13 April,
before Mr Straw had written, Mr Blair told his No.10 team
that the UK
“should put
as many UK people in [ORHA] as possible to help”.133
222.
Mr Straw
visited ORHA in Kuwait on 14 April. During his visit, Maj Gen
Cross
presented
him with a “‘Must – Should – Could’ paper”, listing ORHA posts
which the UK
should
consider filling if it were going “to play a full part in the
post-war business, and if
we wanted
to ensure influence with the US”.134
223.
Mr Moazzam
Malik, Head of DFID’s Iraq Humanitarian Response and
Co-ordination
Team, called Ms Short’s Private Office from Kuwait on 15
April.135
Mr Malik
reported:
“… ORHA is
incredibly awful – badly conceived; badly managed; US driven;
failing;
and
incapable of delivering to our timeframes. There may be things we
could do to
support it,
but it would be a political judgement (and a big political
risk).”
224.
Mr Malik
also reported that he was:
“… very,
very impressed with the UK military. They are doing an extremely
good job
… using the
sort of language you would expect DFID people to use
…”
225.
Mr Straw
wrote to Mr Blair on 15 April, following his return from
Kuwait,
recommending
that the UK should significantly increase its political and
practical support
to ORHA,
including by seconding significant numbers of staff into priority
areas.136
In return,
the UK wanted the US to commit to transparency and joint
decision-making
(see
Section 9.1).
226.
Mr Straw
stated that the US’s intention was:
“… that
ORHA will oversee the Phase IV humanitarian and reconstruction
effort and
restore
normal functioning of Iraqi ministries and provinces, with the aim
of phased
restoration
of full control of government to the Iraqis themselves. In doing
so, the
US intends
that it will work as far as possible with and through existing
ministries in
Baghdad. A
team within ORHA will work on constitutional issues including
setting up
the Iraqi
Interim Authority (IIA). The US also envisage the establishment of
ORHA
‘regional
offices’ in the provinces.”
133
Note Blair
to Powell, 13 April 2003, ‘Note’.
134
Statement
Cross, 2009, pages 18 and 19.
135
Minute
Bewes to Secretary of State [DFID], 15 April 2003,
[untitled].
136
Letter
Straw to Prime Minister, 15 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Office for
Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance
(ORHA)’.
44